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INTRODUCTION 
On November 14, 1986 the Montana Board of Health and 
Environmental Sciences holds a public hearing concerning a 
wastewater discharge permit for a large pulp and paper mill 
in Frenchtown, Montana. The hearing is an exceptional event 
in the record of environmental issues in Montana. It is 
unusual not so much because of the type of issues or parties 
involved, but rather because of the manner in which the 
issue is brought to a conclusion, and the contrast of this 
resolution to previous periods of the pulp mill's history. 
******** 
Twenty nine years earlier, in 1957 the pulp mill 
commenced operations in western Montana without the benefit 
of a thorough public review pertaining to water quality and 
waste treatment requirements. Large fish kills in the Clark 
Fork River resulted in a vocal expression of public concern, 
and the mill's first wastewater .treatment system was 
installed. 
Thirteen years earlier, in 1973 the mill proposed one 
of the largest facility expansions in its history, and the 
expansion permit was granted following an intense period of 
public review and controversy. An experimental treatment 
system was to be installed to handle increased wastewater 
production from the expanded mill. If it proved to be 
inadequate, it was pledged, the system would be replaced 
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and additional water quality degradation would be prevented. 
Three years earlier, on November 10, 1983, a hearing 
was held by the Department of Health and Environmental 
Sciences in Missoula. The subject was generally the same as 
the 1986 hearing, but the atmosphere was markedly different. 
Champion International Corporation had requested a 
relaxation of permit conditions for the discharge of 
wastewater from the Frenchtown mill, in order to avoid the 
replacement of the failed experimental treatment system. 
Over 300 people crowded elbow to elbow into the Missoula 
City Council Chambers to protest the plan and speak on 
behalf of the Clark Fork River and Lake Pend Oreille, into 
which the Clark Fork drains. Busloads of citizens arrived 
from as far away as Sandpoint, Idaho. Many more were turned 
away4> unable to reach the doors of the Chambers. 
During the three year interval between the 1983 and 
1986 hearings the issue received a great deal of scrutiny. 
Extensive studies were conducted to assess the impact of the 
pulp mill's pollution. A basin-wide citizens group was 
formed to stimulate efforts to protect the river and lake. 
Numerous public hearings, meetings and forums were held. A 
special Technical Advisory Committee was formed to help 
design the studies and advise the state agencies regarding 
their results. Most importantly, an extraordinary level of 
communication was established between the parties, and an 
atmosphere of guarded respect and trust eventually replaced 
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one of suspicion and controversy. It was not an easy 
process, and it was certainly not always harmonious. But the 
end result was remarkable. 
At the 1986 hearing, the Board of Health and 
Environmental Sciences heard about two hours of testimony 
and discussion. All the parties were there - the mill's 
owners, conservation groups, state and federal agencies. 
But this time all parties were in agreement. The Board 
listened as various organizations, agencies, associations 
and the industry presented testimony in support of the 
company's new proposal for permit modifications. Not one 
dissenting voice was heard. 
Many members of the Board and audience were astounded. 
One Board member termed the event "refreshing". Another 
stated that, in his opinion, "we had better hurry up and 
approve this thing before somebody changes their mind". 
Others wondered if future controversial issues could somehow 
be resolved in this same fashion. 
******** 
Decision-making for water quality permit issues in 
Montana follows much the same policy format as in any other 
state. The responsible agency, in this case the Montana 
Department of Health and Environmental Sciences, makes a 
tentative decision based on the request of the proposed 
discharger. A preliminary assessment is made to determine 
if that decision may constitute a significant action 
affecting the human environment. The public is notified of 
the tentative decision. A public hearing may be requested 
by the public. If substantial questions are raised 
concerning potential effects on the human environment an 
Environmental Impact Statement is required, along with its 
attendant public involvement requirements. At this point, 
the responsible agency may make its final decision, based on 
the alternatives analyzed and the input of others. This 
decision may then be appealed to the agency's oversight 
body, in this case the Board of Health and Environmental 
Sciences. 
In making its decision, the Department is charged with 
the responsibility to uphold the laws, regulations and 
standards of the state and to respond to the discharger's 
request and public concerns. Upon appeal of that decision, 
the Board is responsible for weighing and balancing the 
interests of conflicting factions and arriving at a decision 
which is in the best public interest. 
Frequently, environmental issues in this state are 
highly controversial and confrontational. There is often 
little communication between the involved parties outside of 
official channels and the news media, and even less mutual 
respect or trust. Conservation groups and the industry tend 
to stand off in their respective corners and take their best 
shot at each other and at convincing the responsible agency 
that their position is the right one. The agency, or the 
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Board, is stuck in the middle, trying to make sense out of 
highly complex and technical issues and make the right 
choice. When they reach their final decision, they are in 
the somewhat awkward position of declaring their position to 
be in the public interest, when in fact their findings may 
not closely resemble the solution originally proposed by any 
of the contestants. 
The Frenchtown pulp mill opened in 1957, and the issue 
of wastewater treatment and water quality in the Clark Fork 
River has raged, on and off, since the very beginning. 
Issues have come and gone, and resolutions have been 
attained in a variety of ways. But at no time until the 
most recent episode has the public played such a clear role 
in the decision-making process in cooperation with the 
industry and agencies. At no time has the conflict 
resolution been mediated by the public and the industry 
themselves, rather than relying on the state government to 
play that role. 
This case study examines the role of public 
participation in water quality decision making at the 
Frenchtown pulp mill from 1951 to 1987, focusing on three 
distinct time periods in that 36 year history: 
1951-1962 - During this time period the construction of 
a pulp mill was heavily promoted by boosters, and the 
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Waldorf Paper Company opened the Frenchtown mill in 
1957. Permitting and siting requirements were minimal, 
and water pollution control requirements were 
nonexistent or not enforced. The role of the public in 
decision making regarding water quality protection was 
ill defined. The strongest public role was evidenced 
by a spirit of advocacy among pulp mill backers. When 
inadequately treated wastes from the mill resulted in 
fish kills in the Clark Fork River many sportsmen and 
conservation interests responded with bitter criticism. 
A form of decision making by crisis resulted in the 
installation of waste treatment facilities, but only 
after severe impacts to the Clark Fork resulted in 
howling protests by the public. This turn of events, 
coupled with air pollution and odor problems from the 
mill, got the pulp mill off on the wrong foot with the 
public in western Montana. Much of the public distrust 
and bitterness lingers 30 years later. 
1973-1974 - During this interval the Frenchtown Mill 
underwent the largest expansion in its 30 year history. 
An extensive set of new pollution control and 
environmental review laws were fresh on the books, and 
the public pursued their application with great vigor 
and zeal. It was the heyday of environmental activism, 
as critics thoroughly analyzed and challenged each and 
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every aspect of the proposed pulp mill expansion. 
Concerned citizens organized into a technically capable 
organization to address air and water quality issues 
related to the mill's expansion. The public's role in 
the decision making process was well defined by 
statute, but key government agencies allowed such 
participation grudgingly. They seemed reluctant to 
surrender their authority by opening their decision 
making process to public concerns and suggestions. 
Conservation interests responded by participating in a 
highly adversarial manner, using every conceivable law 
and regulation to throw roadblocks into the path of the 
expansion, and questioning the competence of government 
officials. There was little effort by any faction of 
the public, industry or natural resource agencies to 
reconcile differences in opinion or resolve conflicts. 
As a result, when the expansion permit was granted 
there was little agreement that water quality resources 
would be protected. 
1983-1987 - During this period the pulp mill requested 
permission for a liberalized waste discharge permit. 
The proposed changes would allow the mill to avoid the 
replacement of a failing treatment system which was 
promised to solve additional waste handling needs 
during the expansion of the 1970's. When state 
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pollution control authorities prepared to routinely 
approve the increased discharge, 27 years of festering 
pubic discontent over water pollution at the mill 
exploded in the form of a basin wide protest. Public 
participation requirements were well defined by 
statute, but agency actions repeatedly limited such 
involvement or failed to respond to legitimate 
concerns. On the other side of the issue, many people 
began to blow the issue out of proportion and 
unreasonably blame the pulp mill for most of the 
river's pollution problems. In 1986, an extraordinary 
set of circumstances led to a conflict resolution 
regarding permit limitations for the pulp mill. For 
the first time in 30 years of controversy at the pulp 
mill the conservation interests became directly 
involved in defining the terms of wastewater discharge 
from the mill. For the first time in 30 years, there 
was unanimous agreement on a water quality decision for 
this facility, and no dissenting voices were heard at 
the Board of Health's public hearing in Helena. 
The 1986 agreement and the manner in which it was 
reached has attracted the interest of many industry and 
conservation groups in Montana. The approach taken on this 
issue has many potential advantages, and some not so obvious 
disadvantages. It is apparent that all interested parties 
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may benefit from a clear and objective analysis of the case 
history and the circumstances required for the resolution of 
this conflict. 
It is worthwhile today to reflect on the lengthy 
evolution of the public's role in decision making about the 
pulp mill and its effects on the Clark Fork River. What 
level of public involvement has been demonstrated over the 
years, and how has this been influenced by the law and the 
prevailing social and political climate of the times? How 
has the industries' attitude toward environmental regulation 
and public concerns changed since 1957? Are conservation 
interests and industries assuming a different role and 
responsibility in the process today, and are they capable of 
sustaining that level of involvement over the years? To 
what degree are today's problems at the mill related to poor 
planning and public involvement in decisions to site and 
regulate the mill in the 1950's? And most importantly, is 
our decision making process well equipped to allow the 
resolution of controversial issues like this one, or is it 
better suited for perpetuating conflicts? 
It is the intent of this case study to address these 
questions. Although the author was directly involved with 
the issue during 1986 as Executive Director of the Clark 
Fork Coalition, a citizens' group, all efforts have been 
made to provide a clear presentation of facts and an 
objective analysis of the issues involved. 
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CHAPTER I - THE EARLY DAYS, DECISION MAKING BY CRISIS 
(1951-1962) 
The Montana Chamber of Commerce, Montana Planning 
Board, Montana State Board of Health, the U.S. Forest 
Service and the U.S. Public Health Service began 
investigating the feasibility of establishing a new pulp and 
paper industry in the state of Montana in the early 1950's. 
It was recognized that Montana's forest lands and existing 
lumber mills provided an adequate resource to support such 
an industry. But it was also recognized that pulp mills in 
other parts of the country had caused the pollution of the 
streams on which they were located. The organizations 
prepared two reports in 1951 and 1955 on prospective pulp 
mill sites in relation to the water quality of the 
Yellowstone, Missouri, Clark Fork, Flathead and Kootenai 
Rivers. Although little useful information was available to 
the investigators regarding water quality and aquatic life 
in the streams in question, suitable sites were selected on 
the Missouri, Flathead, Kootenai and the Clark Fork. 
The investigators used a 200 ton per day (TPD) pulp 
mill as an example in their analysis, and determined that 
such a mill would not reduce dissolved oxygen concentrations 
in the Clark Fork River below those considered adequate for 
the propagation of fish. In reference to the Clark Fork 
River site near Missoula, the report stated: 
"It is believed that a 200 ton kraft pulp mill could be 
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established in this sector without particular harm to 
other uses of the water. There is a considerable 
quantity of organic waste presently being discharged 
into the stream at Missoula. Although an attempt has 
been made to take this into consideration in making 
this estimate, it is extremely desirable that the 
actual effect of these wastes be determined by means of 
a stream survey before the plans for any proposed pulp 
mill in this area progresses beyond preliminary 
planning." 
"It is probable that there will be very little, if any, 
effect on the desirable fish populations. Noticeable 
effect on the appearance of the stream will be limited 
to a relatively short sector below the mill waste 
outlets." (U.S. Public Health Service, et. al., 1955) 
The Montana Board of Health attached an interesting 
discussion to the first site report, in 1951: 
"Our present laws in Montana require that a stream not 
be polluted to such a point that it will affect the 
health of the people. The law does not attempt to 
protect any other water uses such as the use of water 
for irrigation, for other industries, or for fish and 
wildlife. Before such industries do settle in Montana, 
we should have adequate legislation to properly protect 
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our streams, since, if we do not have it before the 
plants are constructed, undoubtably some legislation 
will come shortly after they are in operation. This 
would be very unfair to any industry which might come 
into the state, since that industry would have 
constructed that plant under our present inadequate 
laws and then probably find that it was necessary to 
make very costly changes in their plant which could 
have been made at a minimum cost if the legislation had 
been on the books at the time the plant was 
constructed. 
"It is hoped that those interested in obtaining 
additional industry in Montana will recognize the 
necessity for proper legislation at this time, rather 
than waiting until the streams in Montana have been 
damaged before corrective measures are instituted." 
(U.S. Public Health Service, et. al., 1951) 
The 1955 site report, which included the recommendation 
for a site on the Clark Fork below Missoula, also 
recommended that complete stream surveys be conducted as a 
part of future planning to determine existing physical, 
chemical and biological factors that would be affected by a 
pulp mill discharge. 
The authors also stated that: 
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"Montana and Idaho have a valuable asset in their cold, 
clear waters from snow capped mountain areas. These 
waters are already utilized for the benefit and 
enjoyment of both the citizens and visitors to the 
States. Accordingly, the essential problem is to 
conserve to the fullest extent possible the values of 
these waters for all purposes." 
PROMISES, PLEDGES, PERFORMANCE 
The Frenchtown pulp mill opened in mid-November, 1957 
under the ownership of Waldorf Paper Products and Hoerner 
Boxes. 
The mill's construction was heavily promoted by 
boosters, including several local and statewide economic 
development interests. One of the strongest backers of the 
mill was the State Planning Board, under the leadership of 
Director Perry F. Roys. During the mid-1950's the Planning 
Board unabashedly promoted new industries. Their letterhead 
motto read "Montana, Frontier of Industrial Development." 
Their objective was "To further the development of Montana 
for the economic and social advancement of the people of the 
state." 
The Planning Board was one of the co-sponsors of the 
1955 survey of pulp mill sites, including the Clark Fork 
below Missoula. The results of these surveys, which were 
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admittedly based on very limited data for the streams 
surveyed, were presented at public meetings throughout the 
region, including Missoula, St. Regis, and Kalispell. The 
purpose of these meetings was clearly not to solicit public 
input or concerns, but to provide information to "sell" the 
public on the virtues of new industrial activity. 
Much of the promotion was the responsibility of Perry 
F. Roys. Waldorf Paper Company officials rarely appeared in 
public to discuss their plans in advance of the mill's 
construction. A search of newspaper accounts from the 
period show no direct evidence of company pledges to protect 
the water quality of the Clark Fork River. 
But Perry Roys and other boosters, including the local 
Chamber of Commerce, apparently received much information 
about the proposed facility from Nels Sandberg, Executive 
Vice-President of the Waldorf Paper Products Company. These 
individuals made numerous promises and pledges to civic 
clubs and groups prior to the opening of the mill. Examples 
of these commitments, attributed to Mr. Perry F. Roys in 
1956, include; 
"The (Waldorf) plant operation would be practically a 
closed cycle with introduction of wood products and 
chemicals controlled throughout the process within the 
plant." 
"Because of the modern design of the plant, air and 
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water pollution will be held to a minimum." 
Montana Fish and Game Department Superintendent of 
Fisheries, Walter M. Allen, described the situation in this 
way to the Montana Fish and Game Commission on August 28, 
1958, " We were given a pep talk by the Chamber of Commerce, 
the State Planning Board, and the U.S. Forest Service for 
timber products use and also the University of Montana, 
Forestry Division in favor of paper mills in Montana. We 
actively raised our objections; however, the pilot paper 
plant with assured closed system operation was proposed by 
the Waldorf Paper Company to be at Missoula below the 
Bitterroot River." 
Despite assurances from boosters that water pollution 
would be effectively controlled at the plant, no wastewater 
treatment facilities were installed before the mill opened. 
The regulatory climate associated with the construction of 
this facility was weak, in fact practically nonexistent. 
There was little official review of the proposed facility's 
plans prior to construction, and no mechanism provided in 
the law for enforcement of water quality standards. 
The first six months of plant operation were 
characterized by Waldorf engineers as a period of shakedown. 
Production of pulp was erratic, with periods of startup 
interrupted by shutdown episodes required to maintain 
equipment. When the plant was in operation there were 
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periods of excessive waste discharge and very little control 
of the type of materials disposed in the Clark Fork River. 
The black liquor recovery system was inoperable, and these 
wastes which the company planned to recover and burn were 
discharged directly to the Clark Fork. The original 
blueprints for the plant included an extensive settling 
lagoon system and a distribution pipe across the river to 
allow the dispersion of wastes upon discharge. These plans 
and specifications were to have been approved by pollution 
control authorities. 
The JLagoon system was not constructed until August, 
1958. Dumping occurred from a single outfall point, not the 
diffuser system originally proposed. 
In February, 1958 the Montana Fish and Game Department 
reported the receipt of numerous fisherman complaints 
regarding foam and discoloration of the Clark Fork River 
below the mill. Large quantities of foam on the river's 
surface were reported as far downstream as Superior, 
approximately 50 miles from the mill. The Mineral County Rod 
and Gun Club and the Western Montana Fish and Game 
Association raised strong objections to the pollution 
problems. 
In late February, employees of the Montana Board of 
Health, Fish and Game Department and U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service met with Waldorf Paper Company engineers at the mill 
to discuss the matter of waste discharge to the Clark Fork. 
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The Company was confronted with inquiries concerning their 
performance in the area of waste treatment, and how this 
compared to original plans and commitments. Explanations 
were offered by Waldorf engineers which pointed to numerous 
unforseen complications in the construction and operation of 
the mill. Board of Health and Fish and Game Department 
representatives Don Willems and John Spindler pointed out in 
a February 24 memorandum to the Board of Health that, "no 
commitments of action were made by any party in attendance 
at this meeting: only suggestions were made." In their 
report to the Board, Willems and Spindler concluded that, 
"the administrators and managers of the Waldorf 
Company are basically honest people with the express desire 
to uphold their verbal agreements and commitments made to 
the public and to the various conservation agencies prior to 
their establishment in Montana. It is felt that any orders 
issued at the present time would be most antagonistic to the 
Waldorf Company considering the many problems which have 
presented themselves and which have been unanticipated by 
Waldorf and that they should be given time to work on their 
waste treatment system since very little, if any, damage is 
being done directly to the aquatic life at present. 
However, it is suggested that a limit of five months be 
allowed for this work. That is, their waste disposal system 
should be installed and operating satisfactorily by August 
1, 1958." 
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While pollution control biologists believed that the 
direct discharge of pulp mill effluent was causing little 
damage to the river during the winter and spring of 1958, 
they believed that problems could arise during the low flow 
months of summer. At these times the heavy organic loads of 
mill effluent could combine with low flows and high river 
temperatures to cause severe depletion of oxygen in the 
river water, and possible effects on aquatic life. This was 
the principle reason for Willems and Spindler's 
recommendation that the mill be required to install their 
treatment facilities before August 1, 1958. 
Unfortunately, this was not accomplished. 
During mid-July, 1958, Department of Fish and Game 
investigators noted changes in populations of aquatic 
organisms below the pulp mill. Species of aquatic insects 
known to be sensitive to pollution were found in 
considerably less abundance than in 1957, before mill 
operation (Whitney and Spindler, 1959). It was a sign of 
things to come. 
On the evening of July 31, 1958, anglers along the 
Clark Fork near Ninemile, downstream of the pulp mill, 
reported large numbers of dead fish in the river. 
Concentrations of dead trout, whitefish, suckers and 
squawfish were found in backwater areas for 25 miles 
downstream. Evidence gathered by the Fish and Game 
Department pointed to unknown toxic elements in the effluent 
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as the cause of the fish kill, rather than low oxygen levels 
in river water. Sampling of the river following the kills 
revealed that game fish populations were essentially removed 
from the 25 mile stretch below the mill's discharge (Whitney 
and Spindler, 1959). 
Sportsmen reacted to the fish kill with anger. The 
Montana Fish and Game Department concluded that the pulp 
mill was the cause of the fish kill, based on instream 
surveys and tests conducted on live fish in cages below the 
mill's outlet to the river (Whitney and Spindler, 1959). 
On August 18 the Missoula American Legion Post held an 
open meeting to discuss the fish kill problem. According to 
an August 19, 1958 letter from Dr. Les Pengelly, of the 
Montana State University Wildlife Extension Unit, to Walter 
M. Allen, Superintendent of Fisheries of the Montana Fish 
and Game Department, "Local fisheries men were expected to 
be there, but were not notified, so Mr. Sandberg (of Waldorf 
Company) and his staff of lawyers, chemists and engineers 
were almost unopposed." 
Nels Sandberg stated that the "finger of suspicion 
points to us because we are the new industry on the river." 
He continued to rationalize the problem by stating that he 
made no personal promises to anyone that there would be no 
water pollution from the plant, and that "Missoula must get 
reconciled to industry, if they are going to create jobs, 
pay for their schools and raise their children. They have 
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fish kills all over the country," Sandberg said. 
Waldorf officials publicly denied any responsibility 
for the fish kills. Sandberg told the American Legion Post 
audience that "We have taken all necessary precautions," but 
neglected to state that the originally planned treatment 
lagoon had not yet been constructed. 
Dr. G.D. Carlysle Thompson, Executive Officer of The 
Montana Board Of Health initiated an inquiry before a joint 
Board of Health and Fish and Game Department Meeting to 
"determine whether the mill operation should be permitted to 
continue operation." 
Local sportsmen groups expressed anger over the fish 
kills, and the lack of action by Waldorf on the commitments 
they perceived to have been made by the Company before 
opening the mill in 1957. These same groups, according to 
active member Don Aldrich of Missoula, did not oppose the 
construction of the mill with any sort of organized effort, 
although many members expressed their concerns. Aldrich 
stated, in a 1987 interview, that "Sportsmen were uninformed 
and unaware of the potential problems, and mostly exposed to 
the opinions of the supporters. The Company had no organized 
and technically capable entity to do business with in the 
'50's, outside of the Planning Board and the Chamber of 
Commerce." The sportsmen became directly involved only 
after the fish kill of 1958. As Aldrich put it, "You have to 
take something away to get people to fight." 
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Public response to the fish kill issue was, of course, 
not unanimously against Waldorf Paper Company. There is 
ample evidence that many of the mill's strongest boosters 
continued to support the company. A prime example was an 
editorial, read over the air by an announcer on radio 
station KBTK on August 29, 1958. The announcer stated that, 
"The Fish and Game Commission has been guilty of issuing 
ill-supported hysterical statements regarding the plant. We 
believe they attempted to pass off to the public a very 
minor event as a major catastrophe." 
"It seems to KBTK that the Fish and Game Commission is 
more concerned with the harassment of a new industry than it 
is with its avowed purpose of preserving our marvelous 
fishing streams. Only the very foolish would eat a fish 
that had been caught just below the Missoula sewage dump," 
the editorial continued. 
"The Fish and Game Commission's senseless rushing about 
to keep out all progress from all of western Montana is a 
waste of taxpayers money. 
"Missoula needs the Clark Fork River for fishing like 
it needs an epidemic of smallpox," KBTK claimed. 
The Montana Fish and Game Association, a Missoula-based 
sportsmen group, contacted the Fish and Game Department 
Superintendent of Fisheries, Walter M. Allen, seeking 
action against Waldorf. Dr. Pengelly, who also represented 
the sportsmen group, wrote a letter to Mr. Allen stating 
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that, "...the local Fish and Game Association will be 
satisfied with the efforts put forth by Waldorf, if they 
live up to the promises made to the people of Missoula and 
solve the technical difficulties which seem to beset them." 
Walter Allen responded by approaching the Montana Fish 
and Game Commission, on August 18, 1958, seeking a halt to 
the pulp mill's pollution of the river. The Commission 
responded by passing a resolution stating, "That the State 
Board of Health and the Pollution Control Council be so 
advised that if the condition continues relative to the 
pollution of the Clark Fork River, you will ask that the 
Waldorf Paper Company be enjoined from operating until 
adequate facilities are installed to stop the inflow of 
pollutants into the Clark Fork River." 
No record has been found by the author concerning Board 
of Health action in response to the Fish and Game 
Commission's request. 
Waldorf Paper Company did not respond to citizen and 
agency concerns about their waste disposal until extensive 
damages had occurred and it was clear that public and 
government response threatened their continued operation. 
Promises and pledges were made which were not backed up by 
performance. The Department of Fish and Game and Montana 
Board of Health employees held several conferences with 
Waldorf Paper to find out why an effective treatment system 
had not been constructed. Explanations were offered, but no 
action was taken to solve the problem. 
In retrospect, it seems that the situation boiled down 
to one of decision-making by crisis. It was not until the 
public became sufficiently riled and motivated by the fish 
kill that work began on the mill's lagoon system. Waldorf 
Paper Company initiated the work on their own, without an 
order from the Board of Health, in mid-August 1958 — nine 
months after the mill began production, after Don Willems' 
recommended deadline of August 1, and only weeks after the 
fish kill which focused the public's attention. 
The public clearly played a role in the resolution of 
this problem, but it was not until it became such a 
controversial issue that their opinions were respected. 
Concerned sportsmen and others voiced strong concerns about 
the siting of a pulp mill on the Clark Fork River near 
Missoula, but their interests were not incorporated into any 
formal decision making process. Plans for wastewater 
treatment were submitted to the Pollution Control Council, 
and approved. But there were no public hearings to record 
public comment on the issue, no efforts to incorporate those 
concerns into planning for the facility, no effective state 
permitting authority to control the development and assure 
that plans were followed. 
The pulp mill got off on the wrong foot in western 
Montana. Many citizens in Missoula today find it hard to 
fathom how such a facility could ever have been sited in 
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such a location if reasonable planning had occurred— 
upstream of such a highly regarded trout stream and one of 
Idaho's most pristine lakes, upwind of a growing mountain 
community which is subject to stagnant air inversions, and 
with hundreds of acres of waste settling ponds in the 100 
year floodplain. The State Planning Board's activities in 
the 1950's were in no way related to addressing these public 
concerns, but were instead geared toward the promotion of 
industry and the downplaying of public concerns. People 
still remember the Waldorf Paper Company's lack of action on 
the waste treatment system in 1958. Thirty years later, 
there remains a strong sense of distrust and bitterness 
among those who witnessed this episode. 
EXPANSION, AND MORE PROBLEMS AT THE MILL 
The pulp mill's first major expansion occurred in 1960 
with the installation of its first paper making machine and 
a bleach plant for producing white paper. These additions 
expanded the mill's capacity from 250 TPD (tons per day) of 
pulp to 450 TPD of brown linerboard and 150 TPD of bleached 
pulp. Remember that the original planning exercise 
conducted in the early 1950's based its assessments of 
effects on the Clark Fork on a 200 TPD pulp mill. This 
expansion, much like the initial construction of the mill 
itself, seems to have been conducted with little or no 
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analysis of its effect on the river, or potential mitigative 
measures. 
Following the completion of the mill expansion, The 
Institute of Paper Chemistry performed "A Biological Survey 
of the Clark Fork River in the Vicinity of Missoula, Montana 
-- 1960". It was not until March of 1961 that the 
Department of Fish and Game noted references in this 
document which pointed to future waste discharge problems. 
The report stated that "Increased water usage as a result of 
the manufacture of linerboard, resulted in a general rise in 
the level of wastes within the lagoon system." Since the 
lagoons were constructed in 1958, following the fish kill, 
there had been no direct discharge of effluent to the Clark 
Fork River. The Institute's report continued, "It was 
evident at the time of the 1960 study (early September) that 
some means of emptying the lagoons would have to be provided 
for shortly." (Institute of Paper Chemistry, 1960). 
In a Fish and Game Department Office Memo dated 24 
March, 1961, biologist Bob Averett pointed out to his 
superiors that, "I am not familiar with any proposals by the 
Waldorf people to have us allow them put their wastes in the 
Clark Fork River. It does seem odd that it should be 
mentioned in a report such as this. At any rate we should 
consider that we have been warned in the event they decide 
to dry their ponds some night." 
Averett continued, "I would like to ask Art Whitney 
(Regional Fisheries Manager for the Department of Fish and 
Game) and his people to watch the river quite carefully 
during the spring runoff. I suspect that if they plan to 
dry their ponds they will do it at that time. Perhaps I am 
being too pessimistic, but I had the "Pleasure" of working 
on the first fish kill in this area, and would be unhappy to 
see another." 
Averett*s comments were at the same time revealing and 
prophetic. It was unusual indeed that the state Fish and 
Game Department would first hear about the possibility of 
renewed waste discharge from reading a scientific report of 
this nature. His perspective of mistrust toward the company 
was expressed clearly, and it is likely that his feelings 
were shared by most of the area's sportsmen. The company 
had earned this feeling of mistrust among the public and 
resource agencies as a result of their cavalier attitude 
toward the installation of their waste treatment system 
during their first year of operation. 
Mr. Averett had no way of knowing it, but the Company 
had apparently learned very little from their previous 
experience. Without seeking permission from pollution 
control authorities, Waldorf Paper Company had resumed 
discharge of wastes to the river. The Montana State Board 
of Health conducted a routine field investigation on March 
31, 1961 and found that the mill was discharging 
approximately 1500 gallons per minute into the river for 
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periods of 3-4 days, and then holding back on their 
discharge for the next 3-4 days. 
The Board's Public Health Engineer, Don Willems, 
reported that the discharge as conducted during spring 
runoff would probably not damage biological life in the 
river, so he didn't see any problem with it - even though 
the Board had not been consulted prior to discharge. But 
there was actually little evidence to support or contest 
this assertion. The expansion of pulp and paper making 
capacity at the mill had been conducted without the benefit 
of any review concerning potential effects on water usage 
and disposal or impacts on the Clark Fork River. The 
decision to expand was made by the company, with no 
opportunity for public or agency review and no analysis of 
alternatives for handling increased waste production. 
The Board of Health responded in mid-April with a 
letter to Waldorf paper suggesting that the company alter 
their discharge practices. 
"It is recognized that the river may be able to 
assimilate large quantities of waste at this time. It is 
advised that this not be done since there is considerable 
feeling by the people in Missoula now that the sewage 
treatment plant bonds have passed for that city that all 
others must keep their wastes out of the stream. 
"It is recognized that you have large areas available 
for impounding the wastes and it is suggested that you plan 
to use those areas rather than permitting any direct 
discharge of wastes from your operation into the stream." 
The Board was obviously approaching the issue gingerly. 
The Company had made their decision without public review, 
and the Board could now only suggest that they alter their 
plans, and advise that the citizens of Missoula were 
committed to improving water quality in the river. It was 
essentially the same approach taken in 1958, when the Board 
of Health and Fish and Game Department met with the Company 
to suggest alternatives. The approach didn't work in 1958, 
and it wouldn't work in 1961 either. 
The Company proceeded with their practice of waste 
discharge into the Clark Fork throughout the spring and into 
the summer. No analysis was performed of the potential 
effects of increased waste production or alternatives for 
waste storage and treatment. The stage was set once again 
for decision-making by crisis. 
Bob Averett had made one final, ominous prediction in 
his March, 1961 memo when he expressed his reluctance to 
work on another Clark Fork fish kill. To the displeasure of 
all, his fears were justified - another large kill occurred 
on September 25, 1961. 
The Fish and Game Department received complaints of 
"large numbers of dead fish in the Frenchtown vicinity" on 
September 25 through 29. Railroad workers sighted "hundreds 
of dead fish, discolored water and foam at Paradise" eighty 
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miles downstream from the pulp mill and below the confluence 
with the Flathead River. Bill Bush, of the Western Montana 
Fish and Game Association, investigated the kills in 
response to citizen complaints received at his home, and 
found "hundreds of dead whitefish" at Little's Ranch below 
Frenchtown, "many more than 50 dead whitefish in the river" 
at the railroad bridge at Huson, and at least one dead 3 1/2 
pound rainbow trout at Frenchtown. 
Fish and Game Department investigators traced the kill 
once again to the pulp mill, and blamed it on "an accidental 
or intentional spill of toxic pulp and/or paper wastes." An 
unnamed Waldorf representative later admitted privately to 
Fish and Game Department officials that a break occurred in 
an impoundment dike, through which an estimated 300 to 400 
gallons per minute was discharged into the river for 2 to 3 
hours, according to Fish and Game internal memos. But the 
company publicly denied any discharge of wastes from their 
ponds, blaming the event instead on other possible sources 
in Missoula, including the sewage plant. Nels Sandberg 
claimed publicly that only 50 fish were killed, based on his 
own count from the bridge near Six Mile, about 10 miles 
below the mill. The company's posture irritated state 
wildlife officials, since no evidence of dead fish was found 
in the ten mile stretch of river between Missoula and the 
pulp mill. Additionally, Department investigators observed 
an unauthorized discharge of "dark-colored waste effluent" 
from one of the mill's discharge pipes on October 5. 
Official response to the fish kill was slow to develop. 
In February, 1962 the Board of Health decided to intensify 
their efforts to determine the potential effects of pulp 
mill effluent dumping in the river. A pollution control 
specialist was sent to the pulp mill for an unannounced 
visit to collect samples of wastes from the mill's lagoons. 
The samples would be used in a special bioassay test to 
determine the toxicity of the effluent on aquatic life forms 
in a laboratory. Waldorf Paper Company denied access to the 
investigator, claiming that they had concerns over the 
research methodology and did not want to cooperate in a test 
which could develop inaccurate results to be used against 
them. Although the Board of Health had legal access to the 
property, they did not press the issue. 
On March 1 , 1962 Mr. C. W. Brinck of the Board Of 
Health wrote to Nels Sandberg of the Waldorf Company, 
stating, "...., I believe that the . continued use of the 
ponds, the use of your sprinkling system, and other 
practices which will prevent any direct discharge into the 
river should be continued, since we do not want to instruct 
you to discharge wastes to the stream unless we had some 
idea concerning the safe limits." 
This was the strongest directive issued by the Board of 
Health since the mill began operation in 1957. But the tone 
of the letter was clearly advisory, and apparently had 
32 
little effect on Waldorf's discharge plans. 
On April 3, 1962 Gene Welch and John Spindler of the 
Montana Department of Fish and Game observed a direct 
discharge from the pulp mill into the Clark Fork River. 
According to an Office Memo from Art Whitney, dated April 6, 
this discharge occurred at a river flow of 5,730 cubic feet 
per second (cfs) as measured at St. Regis. Whitney 
expressed his belief that the mill should not discharge 
unless flows exceeded 10,000 cfs. 
On April 16, the Board of Health responded with their 
first definitive instructions for waste discharge from the 
mill. According to a letter from Claiborne Brinck, Director 
of the Division of Environmental Sanitation, the mill was 
permitted to discharge at a rate of 2 cfs continuously when 
river flows exceeded 10,000 cfs, or at a rate of 4 cfs if 
Waldorf desired to discharge for three days and then stop 
for three days. This letter, for the first time, formally 
established spring high flow as the most acceptable season 
for discharge. Waldorf continued to discharge wastes in 
excess of the Board's instructed rates for at least three 
days following receipt of this letter, according to a Field 
Investigation recorded on April 19 by John Spindler. 
An April 24 letter from the Board of Health to Waldorf 
made some vague changes in the previously stated guidelines 
regarding which outfall pipes could be used, and asked for 
accurate records of discharge rates, river flows and pond 
33 
levels throughout the period of discharge. 
The author found no record of any public involvement in 
the determination of discharge practices and limits during 
the period following the 1961 fish kill, and through the 
spring discharge period in 1962. All of the decisions were 
made by the Company themselves, sometimes with notice 
provided to the state Board of Health and other times not. 
The response of the state was consistently to issue 
recommendations or vague directives to the company, which 
they apparently ignored in many instances. 
On April 17, 1963, Board of Health and Fish and Game 
officials met with Waldorf representatives to arrive at 
procedures for waste discharge during the upcoming spring 
discharge period. The decision was reached to recommend 
discharge when river flows exceeded 10,000 cfs, but to allow 
as much as two times the volume to be dumped as that allowed 
in the previous year. Waldorf's request to allow discharges 
down to 5,000 cfs was rejected. The Board of Health followed 
up on this meeting with a letter detailing the procedure and 
requesting notification prior to any discharge of impounded 
wastes. 
This 1963 decision reflected the best professional 
judgement of those agencies involved at the time. It was 
the first notable example of the agencies negotiating 
discharge practices and limits prior to a discharge season 
at the pulp mill. 
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Public reaction to the fish kills in 1958 and 1961 
contributed strongly to the steady progression towards this 
form of negotiated regulation of pulp mill waste discharge. 
But it took over five years of problems and exchanges 
between agencies and mill officials before anything 
resembling a regulatory framework was established. Still, 
the public was not clearly involved with the ultimate 
technical discussions and deliberations which resulted in 
the negotiated permitted discharges. 
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The United States Congress had passed the Water 
Pollution Control Act in 1956, and the first years of water 
quality decision making at the pulp mill were influenced by 
the guidance and directives of this Act. It was the first 
significant Congressional effort to define the federal role 
in water pollution control, and its approach was clearly 
very conservative. The underlying philosophy of the 
legislation is demonstrated by its declaration that water 
pollution abatement is a "uniquely local problem." While 
the Water Pollution Control Act advocated a "partnership" 
between federal and state government in attacking water 
pollution problems, the act left the responsibility for 
setting standards and enforcing them to the states alone. 
This limiting feature of the act was roundly criticized by 
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conservationists because it placed no pressure on the states 
to effectively control pollution problems. In the absence 
of such pressure, it was claimed, few states would 
voluntarily pass strict standards or enforce water pollution 
problems. Many states, like Montana, were anxious to lure 
new industry, and hesitant to place themselves at a 
competitive disadvantage with their neighboring states. 
Water pollution control and regulation at the 
Frenchtown pulp mill was, for the most part, weak and 
ineffective during the period from 1957 to 1962. The state 
of Montana and Missoula were anxious to stimulate new 
economic development during this period, and reluctant to 
discourage this new industry by enforcing stricter 
pollution standards than neighboring states. Federal water 
pollution law did not compel the state to pass or enforce 
effective standards. Public opinion was generally swept up 
in a spirit of boosterism during the mill's planning and 
siting phase. Involvement of those who might be affected by 
pollution from the facility was generally limited until 
severe pollution and fish kills resulted in a form of 
decision making by crisis. At no time during the five year 
period was public participation specifically required by law 
or regulation. 
Not until five full years following the commencement of 
waste discharges at the Frenchtown mill did the state engage 
in a form of water pollution regulation by negotiation. 
The Montana Board of Health and the Water Pollution 
Control Council continued to negotiate allowable discharges 
with the Waldorf Paper Company each year, prior to spring 
discharge. On April 6, 1965, the Council approved an 
increase in allowable discharge from 1,000 to 1,500 gallons 
per minute. Waldorf had requested an increase in allowable 
discharge to 2,500 gallons per minute. 
In early 1966, the Waldorf Paper Company merged with 
Hoerner Boxes to form the Hoerner-Waldorf Corporation. The 
Frenchtown mill underwent its second major expansion, adding 
a second paper machine and chip digesters, and increasing 
capacity to 1,150 tons per day. In the spring of 1966, the 
Montana Board of Health granted the request of Hoerner-
Waldorf to increase its allowable discharge to the Clark 
Fork River. Before the expansion the mill was allowed to 
discharge at a minimum ratio of 50 parts river water to 1 
part waste. Following expansion, permission was granted to 
discharge down to a 25:1 ratio. 
In 1967, a Board of Health Field Investigation 
indicated adverse effects on stream fauna below the mill. 
The Board of Health's Division of Environmental Sanitation 
requested a cessation of discharge in February, and Hoerner 
Waldorf complied for a period of thirteen months, with the 
exception of high water discharge from storage ponds at 
river flows exceeding 10,000 cfs. 
In March, 1968, The Montana Department of Health and 
Environmental Sciences, which had assumed the 
responsibilities of the Board of Health following an 
executive reorganization, issued the Frenchtown pulp mill's 
first formal wastewater discharge permit. The permit 
allowed discharges of 1,500 gallons per minute between May 
1 , 1968 and July 2, 1968 . Hoerner-Waldorf did not use the 
permit to discharge during 1968. 
In 1969 Hoerner-Waldorf installed a primary clarifier 
to provide removal of suspended solids from wastewater prior 
to storage in its settling ponds. 
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CHAPTER 2 - Expansion Occurs in the "Environmental Decade", 
Decision Making by Procedure, (1973-1974). 
The 1970's have been characterized as a decade of a new 
environmental awareness. A greater recognition of valuable 
environmental resources and a growing national commitment to 
protect them resulted in the passage of several pieces of 
landmark federal legislation, including the Water Quality 
Act in 1965, the National Environmental Policy Act in 1970, 
and the Water Pollution Control Act in 1972. The Montana 
Legislature followed with the passage of the Montana 
Environmental Policy Act in 1971 and the Water Quality Act 
in 1967. Further changes were made through the Water 
Pollution Control Act in 1973, to allow state authority to 
administer the National Pollution Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) and to broaden Montana's enforcement 
capabilities. These new environmental statutes, and the 
ensuing adoption of procedural rules to implement them, had 
a profound effect on the regulation and public review of 
water pollution issues in Montana. 
The Montana Water Quality Act directed the Montana 
Department of Health and Environmental Sciences (MDHES) to 
establish a comprehensive pollution control program 
involving stream classifications, standards, nondegradation, 
permits, training and enforcement: 
75-5-101. Policy. It is the public policy to: (1) conserve 
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water by protecting, maintaining, and improving the quality 
and potability of water for public water supplies, wildlife, 
fish and aquatic life, agriculture, industry, recreation, 
and other beneficial uses, (2) provide a comprehensive 
program for the prevention, abatement, and control of water 
pollution. 
75-5-102. Purpose. (1) A purpose of this chapter is to 
provide additional and cumulative remedies to prevent, 
abate, and control the pollution of state waters. 
75-5-103. Definitions. ... (5) "Pollution" means 
contamination or other alteration of the physical, chemical, 
or biological properties of any state waters which exceed 
that permitted by Montana water quality standards, including 
but not limited to standards relating to change in 
temperature, taste, color, turbidity, or odor: or the 
discharge, seepage, drainage, infiltration or flow of any 
liquid, gaseous, solid radioactive, or other substance into 
any state water which will or is likely to create a nuisance 
or render the waters harmful, detrimental, or injurious to 
public health, recreation, safety, welfare, 
livestock, wild animals, birds, fish or other wildlife. 
Under the direction of 75-5-301 the Montana Board of 
Health and Environmental Sciences (MBHES), adopted standards 
and classifications for Montana's streams. The Clark Fork 
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River below Missoula was classified B-l, as follows: 
16.20.618 B-l Classifications (1) Waters classified B-l are 
suitable for drinking, culinary and food processing purposes 
after conventional treatment, bathing, swimming and 
recreation, growth and propagation of salmonid fishes and 
associated aquatic life, waterfowl and furbearers and 
agricultural and industrial water supply. 
In 1971 the Montana Water Quality Act was amended to 
include a strict policy intended to protect all state waters 
from further water quality degradation: 
75-5-303. Nondegradation Policy. The Board shall require: 
(1) that any state waters whose existing quality is higher 
than the established water quality standards be maintained 
at that high quality unless it has been affirmatively 
demonstrated to the board that a change is justifiable as a 
result of necessary economic or social development and will 
not preclude present and anticipated use of these waters, 
and (2) any industrial, public, or private project or 
development which would constitute a new source of pollution 
or an increased source of pollution to high quality waters, 
referred to in subsection (1), to provide the degree of 
waste treatment necessary to maintain that existing high 
water quality. 
The Montana Environmental Policy Act declared a new, 
broad ranging state policy of environmental protection, 
including the formation of the Montana Environmental Quality 
Council, direction to state agencies to prepare 
Environmental Impact Statements on significant actions 
affecting the environment, and requirements for public 
involvement in the preparation of Impact Statements and the 
activities of the Environmental Quality Council: 
75-1-102. Purpose. The purpose of this chapter is to declare 
a state policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable 
harmony between man and his environment, to promote efforts 
which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment 
and the biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of 
man, to enrich his understanding of the ecological systems 
and natural resources important to the state, and to 
establish an environmental quality council. 
75-1-103. Policy. (1) The legislature, recognizing the 
profound impact of man's activity on the interrelations of 
all components of the natural environment, particularly the 
profound influences of population growth, high density 
urbanization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation, 
and new and expanding technological advances, and 
recognizing further the critical importance of restoring and 
maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare and 
development of man, declares that it is the continuing 
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policy of the state of Montana, in cooperation with the 
federal government and local governments and other concerned 
public and private organizations, to use all practicable 
means and measures, including financial and technical 
assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the 
general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under 
which man and nature can coexist in productive harmony, and 
fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of 
present and future generations of Montanans. 
Consistent with Article II, section 3 of the Montana 
Constitution, MEPA declared: 
75-1-103 (3) The legislature recognizes that each person 
shall be entitled to a healthful environment and that each 
person has a responsibility to contribute to the 
preservation and enhancement of the environment. 
Model Rules were later adopted by the Environmental 
Quality Council to implement MEPA through administrative 
procedures of various state agencies. These rules further 
defined procedures for the preparation of Preliminary 
Environmental Reviews and Environmental Impact Statements, 
and required access of public organizations and individuals 
to such documents and to all written comments received by an 
agency. The model rules further outlined requirements to 
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hold public hearings, provide public notice of agency 
decisions and hearings, and to respond to all substantive 
comments in their analysis of the environmental impacts of 
the proposed action and alternatives to that action. 
In August, 1973, when the ink was barely dry on this 
inspired and comprehensive set of federal and state laws and 
regulations, Hoerner-Waldorf Corporation announced plans for 
one of the largest facility expansions in its history. 
The $40 million expansion would increase mill capacity 
from 1,150 tons per day (TPD) to 1,850 TPD, add a new paper 
machine, increase air emissions of sulfur dioxide, and 
increase wastewater discharges from 15.1 million gallons per 
day to an estimated 24.8 million gallons per day. 
Despite the increase in total wastewater volume, Mill 
Manager Hoy Countryman claimed the actual pollution load on 
the Clark Fork River would be decreased. This would be 
accomplished by improvements in spill control within the 
mill and the installation of a secondary treatment aeration 
basin, which had been mandated by MBHES in 1970. Countryman 
was quoted in Hoerner Waldorf's company newsletter, 
Hexiscoop, that "together with changes in mill operation and 
water treatment, (the proposed expansion) will not create 
problems in the river below our mill, but instead can be 
******** 
44 
expected to reduce the probability of problems developing 
that would be detrimental to the stream." 
PULP MILL SEEKS A VARIANCE 
Even before the mill announced its expansion, the first 
nine months of 1973 were a period of renewed controversy, as 
the Hoerner Waldorf Corporation requested a variance to 
permitted waste discharge procedures and the proposal met 
with a wall of opposition from another state agency and 
conservationists. 
On April 25, 1973 Hoerner Waldorf (H-W) wrote to the 
Montana Water Quality Bureau (MWQB) pointing out below 
average precipitation and snowpack conditions in the Clark 
Fork Basin, and forecasting that the mill would be unable 
"to release our total volume of stored effluents," into the 
Clark Fork River. The mill's wastewater discharge permit, 
issued by the state, allowed discharges from the mill's 
settling ponds only at river flows exceeding 10,000 cfs. 
H-W Technical Director Larry Weeks wrote, "We consider it 
extremely important to empty our ponds completely once per 
year, in order to inspect their condition and to perform 
required maintenance." H-W's proposed solution was to allow 
"controlled release to the river at a faster rate" than 
allowed by the permit. "Looking to the future," Weeks 
wrote, "Hoerner Waldorf expects to avoid any reoccurrences 
of this type," due to planned improvements at the mill and 
the installation of secondary treatment facilities as 
required by the state. 
The Montana Department of Health and Environmental 
Sciences (MDHES) amended the mill's discharge permit to 
allow greater wastewater flow rates and discharge at river 
flows down to 7,000 cfs, during 1973. 
The Montana Department of Fish and Game responded with 
strong objections to the permit variance. State Fish and 
Game Director Wesley Woodgerd wrote to DHES on May 4, 
stating, "It is unfortunate that waste discharge rates must 
be increased to accommodate the dumping of the Hoerner-
Waldorf pond sys tem into t h e Clark For k River. The 
inadequacy of Hoerner-Waldorf's waste treatment system was 
recognized in 1966 when a member of your staff, Don Willems, 
recommended a better treatment system to operate effectively 
during low runoff years.... As you know, this operation's 
waste treatment has been controversial since the 
construction of the plant almost 15 years ago." 
On May 8, 1973 The Missoulian newspaper reported that 
Fish and Game Departent officials were upset that they were 
not consulted by MDHES before the permit variance was 
granted, as required by state law. Ralph Boland, chief of 
the Fish and Game Environment Bureau claimed, "We're in the 
typical position of having the health department issue a 
permit without checking with us and then turning their backs 
and walking away from the problem." Fish and Game officials 
claimed that the permit variance should have been "tighter", 
and required the company to bear the expense of monitoring 
the pollution discharge and its effects on the stream. The 
Department was mostly concerned with impacts on oxygen 
levels in the river water, and said that they would monitor 
the waste discharge themselves to protect the river and its 
fishery. 
The Montana Wildlife Federation also opposed the permit 
variance, claiming that an Environmental Impact Statement 
should be prepared and public hearings held. 
MDHES Water Quality Bureau Chief, Don Willems, claimed 
in an internal Department Memo to his superiors, that the 
Fish and Game Department had misrepresented the facts and 
gone, "out of their way to try to make us out as 'bad guys' 
when in fact we spent considerable effort in reviewing the 
situation." But the attitude expressed by the Fish and Game 
Department officials was shared by much of the concerned 
public. The Missoulian editorialized on the subject, 
claiming that state authorities were "incompetent", and that 
"Montana can enact the most enlightened and tough air and 
water pollution control laws; it can pass the nation's 
toughest strip mine reclamation laws, and none of all that 
means piffle if the bureaucrats fail to administer those 
laws effectively." 
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The decision made by the Water Quality Bureau to grant 
the variance may or may not have been the correct one, but 
the questionable way in which they arrived at the decision 
drew public criticism and cast doubt on its merits. State 
law required the health department to consult with the Fish 
and Game Department, through a liaison provided at Fish and 
Game expense. This task was not performed. And the public 
was not consulted either, despite requirements of the 
National Environmental Policy Act and Montana Environmental 
Policy Act to prepare and make public the results of 
environmental assessments, and to perform an Environmental 
Impact Statement and hold public hearings if substantial 
questions are raised about the potential impact on the 
environment. 
Despite the Water Quality Bureau's careful staff review 
of the data and the potential effects of the proposed 
variance, the public and other state agencies were not 
involved in the decision making process. 
An ensuing turn of events clearly demonstrated that 
they could have saved themselves much trouble and arrived at 
a more agreeable decision had they taken the trouble to 
involve other interested parties. 
On May 17, several officials of the Montana Department 
of Fish and Game, including Jim Posewitz, Boyd Opheim and 
Ralph Boland met directly with Hoerner Waldorf to discuss 
their disagreements with the terms of the variance. As a 
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result of that meeting, H-W agreed to restrain their 
discharge to periods of river flows exceeding 10,000 cfs, as 
originally required by their permit, and to perform instream 
testing for dissolved oxygen to assess the increased rate of 
wastewater discharge allowed by the variance. If oxygen 
levels were found to go below the state standard, H-W would 
restrict their rate of discharge. This compromise was 
achieved without great difficulty, through open 
communication of concerns between the two parties. 
The Water Quality Bureau's failure to allow such an 
expression of concerns in their decision making process 
clearly prevented them from reaching a decision which was 
acceptable to all parties involved, and brought considerable 
public criticism upon themselves. 
This episode set the stage for heightened public 
controversy when the DHES Water Quality Bureau considered 
Hoerner Waldorf's plans for expansion. 
THE OPPOSITION EXPLODES 
In September, 1973 the Missoula County Democratic 
Central Committee called for a moratorium on growth at the 
pulp mill. In a written statement, the committee said 
pollution control equipment was not yet proven, and "It was 
felt that the people of Missoula have the right to assess 
the effectiveness of present control devices....before 
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agreeing to an expansion which would substantially increase 
pollution levels." 
The Montana Board of Health and Environmental Sciences 
had ordered the mill to install a secondary, aeration basin 
treatment system for its wastewater by ]^97^) to comply with 
the Best Practicable Treatment requirement of the Clean 
Water Act. The company included this new system in its 
proposed $40 million expansion. But the Missoula County 
Democrats and many environmentalists were concerned that the 
new system should be tested to assure it was capable of 
handling the wastes of the mill at its current production 
levels, before permission was granted to allow a 60% 
production expansion. 
Also in September, a new organization called the 
"Concerned Citizens for a Quality Environment" (CCQE) formed 
to address the overall air and water quality issues related 
to the pulp mill's expansion proposal. It was the first 
citizen's group formed to focus on the overall environmental 
effects of the Frenchtown pulp mill, since the mill opened 
in 1957. 
Hoerner Waldorf prepared their own Environmental Impact 
Statement on the proposed expansion, and submitted it to the 
MDHES. The company selected a panel of experts to prepare 
an EIS summary, which unabashedly supported the expansion 
and discounted potential environmental effects. Copies of 
this summary were distributed by the Missoula Chamber of 
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Commerce to each of their members, with a letter stating 
that, "The Missoula Area Chamber of Commerce endorses the 
proposed mill expansion plans revealed by Hoerner Waldorf 
Corporation on August 28, 1973, providing the expanded mill 
conforms to Montana environmental standards as they have 
publicly committed themselves to do." 
The Concerned Citizens For A Quality Environment began 
asking tough questions about the mill's expansion plans. 
Has H-W committed tax fraud by purchasing recovery boilers 
with tax free pollution control bonds, even though such 
bonds were not to be used to finance expansion? Can the 
pond system be expanded in the floodplain without increasing 
the hazard of a 100 year flood event? Will the mill's 
filtration of wastes into the ground lead to unlawful 
contamination of groundwater? Should H-W be forced to apply 
for a new permit to increase their waste discharge to the 
river before they get a permit to expand the mill? If the 
mill's treatment system was not adequate to comply with 
their discharge permit during low river flows in 1973, how 
can we be sure that the new system mandated by the state to 
handle present mill production will be adequate to deal with 
a 60% increase in production? 
CCQE attracted the technical support of an inspired and 
committed group of volunteers, including several professors 
from the University of Montana. Never before had the mill's 
waste discharge plans been subjected to such a thorough 
public review by a technically capable conservation group. 
And never before had a citizens' group worked under such a 
comprehensive new set of state and federal environmental 
laws and regulations. This, coupled with the long 
chronology of controversy over water issues at the mill and 
a bitter mistrust of state officials' handling of the permit 
variance in 1973, set the stage for the most divisive and 
protracted environmental battle in the mill's history. 
Things really started to heat up in 1974. 
On January 18, the Montana Board of Health and 
Environmental Sciences adopted rules to implement the 
Montana Pollution Discharge Elimination System, for issuing 
wastewater discharge permits. This step began the process 
to allow Montana to assume authority over water pollution 
permits from the federal Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA). This proposed shift in permitting authority came 
only 9 months after the publication of federal rules for the 
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), and 
added a complicating twist to the pulp mill issue just as it 
was beginning to unfold. Many people, including the members 
of the CCQE, had little respect for the Montana Water 
Quality Bureau and its chief, Don Willems. The poor 
handling of past permit issues at the pulp mill, including 
the 1973 variance, and the lack of enforcement capabilities 
in the Bureau caused the CCQE to oppose the state's 
assumption of the MPDES program. This issue would confound 
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the consideration of Hoerner Waldorf's proposed expansion. 
Also in January, the CCQE intensified its 
investigations of water quality issues and the H-W 
expansion. An attorney was retained to provide a thorough 
analysis of legal issues surrounding the expansion, and the 
new avenues of public influence enabled by recent 
environmental legislation, including public hearings and 
citizen lawsuits. By this point in time it was clear that 
the CCQE was becoming exceptionally well prepared for the 
ensuing discharge permit and expansion permit battles. Its 
core group of Clancy Gordon of the University of Montana 
Department of Environmental Studies, Ron Erickson of the 
Chemistry Department, Robert Curry of the Geology Department 
and Gail Owen, a private citizen with an engineering 
background, were geared up to scrutinize every detail of the 
mill's proposals on both a technical and legal basis. 
Citizen involvement had truly come a long way since the days 
of apathy and complacency in the 1950*s. 
On February 14 , 1974 the League of Women Voters 
sponsored a Public Meeting in Missoula. The meeting was 
held at the request of the Water Quality Bureau, and its 
purpose was to allow the Bureau to explain its water quality 
programs and the proposed transfer of federal permitting 
authority to the state. Things didn't turn out exactly as 
planned. The Hoerner Waldorf water quality permit and 
expansion plans were foremost on the minds of those in 
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attendance. It was an opening salvo in what would be a long 
battle for the CCQE. 
The CCQE's Bob Curry opened the meetings testimony by 
grilling Water Quality Bureau Chief Don Willems about 
several procedural issues relating to the issuance of the 
upcoming 1974 discharge permit. He asked what provisions 
the Bureau planned for a public hearing on the permit, and 
Willems responded, "There's none for this coming permit," 
according to typed transcripts of the meeting prepared by 
CCQE. Willems further explained that the WQB expected to 
issue a permit for the 1974 spring discharge by the end of 
February, and when pressed, indicated that this meeting was 
conceived as a form of public input for that permit 
decision. Section 401 of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act allowed state certification of federal discharge 
permits, and provided for pubic hearings. But the Water 
Quality Bureau's plans to shortcut that process, take public 
input in a meeting sponsored for a different purpose, and 
issue a decision only two weeks following the public meeting 
caused more consternation among the CCQE. 
Bob Curry summed it up by stating, "there is some lack 
of faith among members of the public about the ability of 
the Bureau to carry out water pollution control programs 
under existing laws and regulations." 
When asked if the Water Quality Bureau would consider 
denying a discharge permit to Hoerner-Waldorf, Willems said, 
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"you'd have to have a good reason." 
"A violation of the law isn't a good reason?", asked 
Curry. 
"Would you say there's a serious violation?", asked 
Willems. 
"You're trying to put degrees on violations of the 
law." Curry retorted, "The law is utterly immune to 
degrees." 
CCQE representatives Curry and Ron Erickson detailed a 
long list of permit and state standard violations dating 
back to at least 1969, including inaccurate or missing data 
reporting, excessive discharges of color, and 
misrepresentations of fact relating to phenol content in H-W 
permit applications. Curry cited internal WQB memos 
indicating knowledge that the mill was violating state 
discharge permits and standards, and noted that the WQB had 
failed to take action. He stated that H-W had supplied 
incomplete data reporting to the state since at least 1969, 
and the WQB had done nothing to correct the reporting 
problems. Ron Erickson pointed out that H-W had submitted 
permit applications containing false representations that 
phenols were "absent", despite knowledge that they were 
present. He pointed out that state standards for the Clark 
Fork's Bl classification clearly state that phenols shall 
not be discharged. CCQE representatives further explained 
that the Montana Water Quality Bureau and the Department of 
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Health and Environmental Sciences were ill-equipped with 
legal and enforcement staff and budget to administer the 
state MPDES permit program. 
The Bureau's Abe Horpestad maintained that since the 
state Department of Fish and Game had been unable to 
demonstrate toxic effects of the H-W discharge in the river, 
phenols discharge from the mill should not be considered a 
problem. 
The CCQE asserted that the Montana Water Quality Bureau 
was ill-prepared to assume authority from the EPA for 
wastewater discharge permitting, and that the 1974 permit 
should not be reissued until substantive assurances were 
given that state standards and laws would not be violated in 
the future. 
In a March 27, 1974 letter to attorney Jim Goetz, the 
CCQE's Bob Curry wrote that the transcript of the February 
meeting "presents evidence of statements made by Willems and 
his staff about his inability to carry out the 
administration of his program, his lack of funding, and his 
unwillingness to abide by the laws of his own state." He 
summed up the CCQE's philosophy by stating, "I think that we 
need to use every legal device possible to gain as much time 
from Hoerner-Waldorf before issuance of any expansion 
permits or dumping permits so that we may be able to gain 
information from ongoing and proposed studies about the 
impact of the proposed expansion." 
The delay tactics employed by the CCQE, and many other 
environmental groups across the state on other issues, led 
industry representatives to label the conservationists as 
"environmental obstructionists". The CCQE had stated their 
position clearly in public, explaining that they did not 
actually oppose the expansion, but wanted it delayed until 
the company could prove the environment would not be 
damaged. But industry backers didn't buy this explanation, 
claiming that the environmentalists were a "radical 
minority", who sought to limit economic growth and 
industrial expansion. Some CCQE members may have actually 
believed in this no-growth philosophy, but the majority did 
not and it was not the organization's express policy. The 
pulp mill backers who used the obstructionist label for 
environmentalists were in fact misrepresenting their 
opponents official stance on the issue. No matter how 
strongly they believed that they were right about the 
environmentalists true motivations, the name calling did not 
contribute to a dialogue between the opposing factions, or 
an efficient resolution of the expansion controversy. 
The CCQE's position on the H-W expansion sought ct delay 
in permissign to expand while air and water pollution 
control programs were put in place to insure that all state 
and federal standards could be met. Additionally, on a 
philosophical level, the environmental group claimed that if 
the mill had the money to greatly expand its mill, then they 
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should also have been able to install the best waste 
treatment systems available. 
Gail Owen, a free lance writer who performed extensive 
technical research for CCQE, claimed that numerous other 
pulp mills in the U.S. and other countries had installed and 
demonstrated more effective air and water pollution 
treatment processes than those proposed by the Frenchtown 
mill. Owen told the Missoulian that the mill seemed to view 
pollution control, "as though it was a millstone around 
their necks," and that they believed, "their potential 
profit would be greater if they reverted back 10 years." 
"To convey to the public that it (installing better 
treatment) can't be done is false, it costs money though," 
Owen noted. His calculations indicated that installing the 
best available air and water pollution controls would 
roughly double the $8.1 million capital costs and triple 
the $700,000 annual operating costs for pollution controls 
at the mill. 
The CCQE's Ron Erickson said, "Do this: give us the 
best available technology. That will meet state standards. 
That will better state standards. It's corporate 
citizenship." 
The CCQE's philosophical position on using the best 
waste treatment money can buy was met with much sympathy in 
the Missoula community at the time - many people remembered 
the promises and pledges expressed by boosters before the 
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mill came to town, and remembered the more recent (as late 
as the early 1970's) air pollution episodes when the entire 
Missoula Valley smelled like a rotten egg. Despite a common 
statement among mill boosters that, "It smells like bread 
and butter to me," the vast majority of Missoulians seemed 
to not appreciate the stench, and the air pollution issue 
became the most popular rallying cry for expansion 
opponents. A separate environmental group, GASP( Gals 
Against Smog and Pollution) had formed to fight the air 
pollution battle in the late 1960's. 
Civil disobedience became a tactic used by the 
expansion opponents. Protesters from the university camped 
across the river from the mill and placed their bodies in 
the path of effluent disposal in discharge ditches. 
The CCQE collected over 7,200 signatures from western 
Montana residents on a petition requesting that the Governor 
and Board of Health delay the approval of the H-W expansion 
for two years, or until 1) the company is in compliance with 
all current state standards, and 2) reasonable assurance can 
be given that the expansion will not cause future 
violations. 
But for water pollution controls, the CCQE and other 
opponents had poor legal backing for their claim that the 
mill should install the best, and most expensive waste 
treatment facilities. The federal Water Pollution Control 
Act directed that pulp mills install the "Best Practicable 
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Treatment" by 1975, and such measures had already been 
mandated by the state Board of Health in a compliance order, 
directing the mill to install the secondary aeration basin 
treatment system by 1975. This system was already a part of 
the mill's expansion plans. The Act further directed that 
"Best Available Treatment" systems be in place by 1983, but 
these technologies were not defined in 1974 as the mill 
expansion was being considered. And the 1983 deadline would 
never actually be met, as it turned out. 
On March 12, 1974, the Department of Health and 
Environmental Sciences issued a nine month wastewater 
discharge permit to H-W, allowing discharges in the coming 
spring runoff season. The permit was issued under the 
authority of the Montana Water Pollution Control Act, since 
neither the EPA or state had yet initiated the NPDES or 
MPDES permit programs. 
The next major event in the expansion controversy 
occurred on May 29, when the EPA held a pubic hearing in 
Missoula regarding the issuance of the first NPDES 
wastewater discharge permit for the mill. Since the state 
had not yet received approval to assume control of the MPDES 
permitting program, the decision making process continued 
under the auspices of the federal agency. EPA provided 
public notice of the hearing over one month before the 
event, and circulated a 16 page "Fact Sheet" which was 
actually a complete draft permit. 
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On May 15, Frederick Kreiger, a chemical engineer for 
the EPA's west coast region sent a six-page letter to the 
EPA's Denver Region headquarters, charging that the proposed 
permit was inadequate and in violation of EPA regulations. 
Kreiger wrote, "After reading and studying the proposed 
permit I have concluded that the permit will neither 
limit the wastewater discharge as stringently as is being 
required of comparable pulp and paper mills nor adequately 
protect the biota of the Clark Fork River." Kreiger, who 
reviewed similar applications for the EPA region 10, 
prepared a list of eight areas of deficiency in the proposed 
permit, including lack of control over waste disposal by 
seepage from the mill's ponds, and loose restrictions on the 
discharge of total suspended solids (TSS) and biochemical 
oxygen demand (BOD). 
Kreiger's letter was an unusual expression of intra-
agency criticism, and the move certainly created some hard 
feelings among the EPA Region 8 staff whom he criticized. 
Bob Burm, head of the Region 8 engineering staff took 
exception to Krieger's criticisms in a May 23 , 1974 
Missoulian article. But Burm acknowledged one major error 
in calculating allowable discharges of TSS, and attributed 
the error to the misplacement of a decimal point showing 
that the mill had discharged 12 million pounds of TSS in 
1971, instead of the amount they actually discharged, 1.2 
million pounds. Based on this error, Burm said, the EPA 
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proposed allowing a discharge of 5.96 million pounds per 
year. Kreiger maintained that allowing such an increase in 
discharge of TSS or BOD would result in stream degradation, 
and be in violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act Amendments of 1972, which state that "The purpose of 
this Act is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical 
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 
Krieger's criticisms added fuel to the fire of 
controversy over the permit issue, just two weeks before the 
EPA's public hearing. 
The CCQE began to focus on the issue of designing the 
new permit to meet the need of the expanded mill prior to 
approval of the expansion itself. The organization's 
written comments to the EPA regarding the NPDES permit 
proposal stated, "As both EPA and the Montana Department of 
Health are well aware, Hoerner Waldorf must procure a 
construction permit through the Montana Air Quality Bureau 
prior to any construction. Unless EPA takes the position 
that the approval of Hoerner Waldorf's proposed 
expansion is simply a rubber stamp it should not issue a 
five-year water discharge permit based on an assumed 
expanded capacity. Clearly if Hoerner Waldorf's expansion 
does not materialize, the 2,850,000 lb. BOD yearly 
"limitation" becomes a generous license to pollute." 
The EPA's Bob Burm told the Missoulian, "We are 
presuming that it (the expansion) will be approved," but he 
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did not think this amounted to an EPA endorsement of the 
expansion. "If the expansion is turned down... any permit 
would have to be revised," he said. But Burm failed to 
explain that the permit could also be written based on 
current production levels, and then revised when the 
expansion was approved. This procedure would have resulted 
in effluent limitations based on a mill production of 1,150 
tons per day instead of 1,850, and would have certainly 
caused less consternation among environmental critics. But 
the EPA stuck to their guns on the issue stubbornly, and the 
proposal gained bureaucratic inertia. If the EPA had wished 
to intentionally provoke its critics, it could not have done 
it any better than this. 
At the May 29 hearing, the CCQE's Ron Erickson seized 
on this issue, pointing out that the language of the permit 
application reads, "Any anticipated facility expansions, 
production increases, or process modifications which will 
result in new, different, or increased discharges of 
pollutants must be reported by submission of a new NPDES 
application, or if such changes will not violate the 
effluent limitations specified in this permit, by notice to 
the permit issuing authority of such changes." 
The Montana Department of Fish and Game also opposed 
the proposed NPDES permit, because, "...in our opinion, 
greater damage to the aquatic resources of the Clark Fork 
River will result under the permit stipulations as written." 
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The Department urged that 10,000 cfs river flow be used as a 
cutoff for wastewater discharges, as proposed by EPA, and 
that the permit limitations be based on the mill's present 
capacity with secondary treatment, that ponds should be 
sealed to prevent uncontrolled disposal of wastes through 
seepage, and numerous other recommendations. 
The Department's letter to the EPA made the first 
known reference to the potential problems of excessive 
nutrient additions in the mill's new secondary treatment 
system. In this system, nitrogen and phosphorous would be 
added to the aeration basins to promote the growth of 
organisms which would help break down the mill's waste 
before discharge to the river. The Department of Fish and 
Game pointed out that the proposed permit made no reference 
to allowable concentrations of nitrogen and phosphorous in 
the river, and that no baseline data was available to assess 
the effects of the mill's new nutrient additions. This very 
issue would become perhaps the most important single factor 
in the permit controversy 12 years later, in 1986. 
On June 10, the EPA officially transferred wastewater 
permit authority to the state of Montana under the MPDES 
program. 
THE MILL EXPERIMENTS WITH RAPID INFILTRATION 
Beginning in December 1973 and January 1974, Hoerner 
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Waldorf had begun to test a new form of waste treatment 
called rapid infiltration. The system involved the disposal 
of mill effluent into the soil and upper groundwater, and 
eventually the river, through filtration basins which were 
separate from their existing 700 acre settling ponds. The 
treatment system was developed under the guidance of 
consultant Dr. Al Wallace, of the University of Idaho. Each 
basin was dosed with a load of effluent, which was then 
allowed to percolate quickly into the ground, followed by a 
period of basin drying to prevent anaerobic soil conditions 
which could cause the basins to plug and prevent 
infiltration of wastes. 
The company installed two experimental basins totalling 
just 13 acres in early 1974, and another 20 acres later that 
summer. Preliminary test results based on test wells 
downgradient from the basins indicated that over 90% of the 
effluent color could be removed by this process before it 
reached the Clark Fork. 
Rapid infiltration became Hoerner-Waldorf's answer to 
its problem of increased color discharge from their 
proposed, expanded mill. Montana's state color standard, 
which allowed an increase of no more than 5 "standard color 
Units" in the Clark Fork River, had been a problem for the 
mill in the past. During periods of direct discharge in the 
spring, and in periods of low river flow, when the mill's 
settling ponds continued to seep highly colored material 
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into the river, color standard violations were commonplace. 
Kraft paper mills like the one at Frenchtown produce a dark, 
coffee-colored waste consisting of lignins, solids and BOD. 
During 1973, color tests taken by the company during the May 
and June discharge season indicated water quality standard 
violations in every test, with a maximum increase of twenty-
one color units in the river ten miles below the mill. EPA 
tests found that the color standard was violated 50% of the 
time when the mill was not directly discharging, and the 
only wastes entering the river were seepage from the ponds. 
The mill had previously announced that a newly 
developed bleaching process, called the Anti-Pollution 
Sequence (APS) would be employed in the mill expansion to 
remove up to 70% of the color from its highly colored bleach 
plant effluent, and that the system would achieve an overall 
reduction in color discharge from the mill despite the 
expansion. Although the Frenchtown mill produced only about 
150 tons per day of bleached pulp, in comparison to 1,000 
tons of brown pulp for linerboard, the bleach plant produced 
a higher volume of highly colored waste. When mill manager 
Roy Countryman announced the new system in January, 1974, he 
complained about the strict standard while at the same time 
praising the new system's ability to comply with it, "To our 
knowledge, the present color standard on the Clark Fork 
River is the tightest standard in the nation. This new 
bleaching process, combined with other mill improvements to 
our effluent system will, we believe, allow the expanded 
mill to meet this standard." He claimed that the new system 
would allow H-W to actually reduce total color from the mill 
by 55% following expansion. 
The CCQE and others scrutinized the company's 
optimistic claims about the APS systems during the NPDES 
review process. Jim Carlson, CCQE volunteer and graduate 
student at the University of Montana Department of 
Environmental Studies, performed studies on color from pulp 
mills in the U.S. and calculated that the expansion could 
lead to a net increase of up to 23% in color discharges 
after expansion. 
Carlson also found that at least five pulp mills in th§. 
U.S. had already installed a color removal treatment process 
using lime applications to collect pollutants, which were 
later burned in the plants' lime Wilns. The CCQE's Gail 
Owen presented an extensive literature review to the state 
concerning the best available technology for the mill's 
effluent treatment, focusing on activated carbon techniques. 
Hi_s_ research found that the activated cai-bxxn technique had 
been extensively tested and demonstrated excellent results 
for color removal in Canada, Japan and other countries. The 
technologies were proven and effective, Carlson and Owen 
claimed. But the cost was higher than the use of the soils 
and groundwater in the rapid infiltration disposal system. 
It was those high costs that the company sought to avoid. 
67 
A February, 1974 Hoerner Waldorf report entitled," 
Water Quality Control Program For Hoerner Waldorf 
Corporation Mill Expansion" stated that "No degradation of 
the quality of the Clark Fork River will occur as a result 
of the mill expansion," based on a "...combination of 
clarification, secondary treatment, plus rapid infiltration, 
which will provide further effluent renovation beyond 
secondary treatment,..." (Hoerner-Waldorf, 1974). 
The Department of Health and Environmental Sciences 
prepared a Draft Environmental Impact Statement in June, 
1974. The Draft EIS indicated that the proposed expansion 
of the H-W pulp and paper mill would be based on a 
continuation of the practice of effluent ponding, and 
elimination of the effluent by evaporation, direct discharge 
to the river when its volume exceeded 10,000 cfs, and by 
rapid infiltration into floodplain gravels and ultimately 
into the Clark Fork River. The mill's current pond capacity 
was 745 acres, and about 15.7 million gallons of effluent 
were discharged to the ponds per day. One-third of the 
effluent was discharged directly to the river following 
primary and secondary treatment and ten day retention in the 
ponds, with the remaining amount either evaporating or 
seeping through the pond dikes and bottoms. The proposed 
expansion would increase the effluent production of the mill 
to about 21.6 million gallons per day, requiring an 
additional 325 acres of ponds (DHES, 1974). 
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Hoerner-Waldorf had been experimenting with the rapid 
infiltration disposal technique since late 1973. Its 
consultants predicted it would be successful, and would 
allow the mill to increase their effluent seepage rate from 
10 million gallons per day to 20.3 million gallons per day. 
The Draft EIS indicated that if rapid infiltration was 
not successful, an estimated 6 to 48 per cent of the mill 
effluent would be discharged to the river, depending on 
river flows and dilution capabilities. 
THE STATE HOLDS A PUBLIC HEARING 
On August 3 and 5, jjr74_the Montana Department of 
Health and Environmental Sciences held a public hearing in 
Missoula regarding the Draft EIS on the proposed mill 
expansion. The two day hearing was exceptionally lengthy 
and contentious. Opening statements by the Hoerner-Waldorf 
Corporation and its consultants lasted over three hours. The 
CCQE reserved nearly six hours of testimony, involving 32 
speakers including numerous university professors, 
physicians, students, researchers and private citizens. 
Hoerner-Waldorf brought in Dr. Al Wallace, a consulting 
engineer who developed the new rapid infiltration system 
which the mill proposed to use to handle much of the 
increased wastewater production following expansion. 
On the issue of water quality, Dr. Wallace's proposed 
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rapid infiltration disposal method received the most 
scrutiny. Critics pointed out that there was a paucity of 
data available to determine what effect the disposal of 20.3 
million gallons per day would have on ground water 
resources. There was also considerable concern as to 
whether the system would actually work as well as predicted 
by the H-W consultant, and what would happen if it failed. 
The Montana Environmental Policy Act required that an 
Environmental impact Statement include descriptions of, "Any 
irreversible and irretrievable commitments of natural and 
economic resources which would be involved in the proposed 
action should it be implemented. This requires the agency 
to identify the extent to which the action curtails the 
range of alternative and beneficial uses of the 
environment." 
The revised guidelines for Environmental Impact 
Statements indicated that, (Item 3.(b)) "If an agency relies 
on an applicant for the submission of initial environmental 
information, the agency shall assist the applicant by 
outlining the type and quality of information required. In 
its own determination on the applicant's evaluation of the 
environmental issues, the agency must assume responsibility 
for the scope and content of the draft and final 
environmental statements." 
The Draft Environmental Impact Statement on the 
proposed expansion stated, on page 91, "The anticipated 
ef fluent,... results in an increase of 20.3 mgd (million 
gallons per day) to the shallow ground water system or an 
increase of 103 percent from the present ground disposal of 
10,2 mgd. The impact of this added volume on existing 
ground water" flow pattern cannot be predicted from available 
data." (DHES, 1974) 
James Carlson, of CCQE, testified at the public hearing 
that "This lack of data does not appear to comply with the 
revised guidelines of MEPA which require, "A description of 
the proposed action including information and technical data 
adequate to permit a careful assessment of environmental 
impact by commenting agencies and the public." 
The DEIS also stated on page 91, "There is also 
definite evidence of vertical movement of waste effluent 
from the upper shallow aquifer into the deep aquifer. The 
general extent of long-range implications of vertical 
interaquifer movement of wastewaters are not known." (DHES, 
1974). 
Carlson claimed that the_^pollution of the deep aquifer 
represented an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of 
resources for which there was inadequate information 
supplied by the applicant and the DHES to make an informed 
decision under MEPA. He asked that the expansion be 
postponed for two years or until adequate information could 
be supplied relating to groundwater flow patterns and the 
impacts of additional ground water disposal of effluents by 
rapid infiltration. 
Concerned citizens also criticized the Draft EIS" 
indication that if the Rapid Infiltration system were to 
fail, as much as 48% of the mill's effluent would have to be 
disposed of by direct discharge into the Clark Fork River, 
up from 33% before mill expansion. The Draft EIS provided 
no analysis of alternatives for the effective 
treatment of wastes, including a replacement treatment 
system, to handle this contingency. 
The DHES published its Final EIS on November 6, 1974, 
and issued their decision to grant the requested permit for 
expansion without delay. Over 7200 Missoula Valley 
residents had signed petitions requesting a two year delay 
while effective pollution control systems were developed. 
The Department received 140 written comments on the Draft 
EIS, of which 70% opposed the expansion. The Missoula City-
County Health Department initially requested a two year 
delay, but later supported the granting of the permit if 
certain conditions were met regarding monitoring and studies 
of human health and the relation to sulfur dioxide 
emissions. Fifty-two Missoula physicians signed a letter 
requesting the delay while the proposed monitoring and 
research was conducted. A telephone survey conducted in the 
fall of 1973 indicated 156 persons in favor of expansion, 
195 against, and 102 with no opinion. 
The DHES dealt with the issue of wastewater treatment, 
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and the rapid infiltration system in the following manner: 
"If rapid infiltration tests not completely successful 
in removing color to meet standards, or if it appears that 
domestic wells adjacent to the H-W property will be polluted 
with the increased water discharge, an alternate means of 
treatment will be required. 
"Treatment techniques are available which would allow 
disposal of additional wastewater from the expanded mill 
without violation of Montana Water Quality Standards. Rapid 
Infiltration will have low operation and maintenance costs 
when compared to physical-chemical treatment. If it is 
proved to be totally or partially unsuccessful, other 
treatment means could be installed to allow disposal without 
additional water degradation." (emphasis added) (DHES, 
1974) . 
Hoerner-Waldor f' s position on rapid infiltration, as 
indicated in the FEIS, stated: 
"Rapid Infiltration, combined with in-plant 
improvements, should allow H-W to meet the color standard 
without a large commitment of resources that would be 
required to install and operate presently available color 
removal systems. However, should the present approach of 
rapid infiltration, APS bleaching and other in-plant 
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improvements indicate that this system will not allow the 
color standard to be met, further steps will be taken, up to 
and including color removal from selected effluent streams, 
so that the expanded mill will meet the color standard." 
* * * * * * * *  
Hoerner-Waldorf's Frenchtown pulp mill proposed one of 
the largest facility expansion in its history in 1973. The 
proposition came fresh on the heels of a permit variance 
controversy caused by inadequacies in their wastewater 
treatment system. The expansion and wastewater discharge 
permits came under intense public scrutiny, and were 
reviewed within the framework of an array of new 
environmental protection laws and regulations. 
The majority of pubic response to the Department of 
Health and Environmental Sciences Draft Environmental Impact 
Statement opposed the proposed pulp mill expansion. 
Although water quality concerns were important to 
conservationists, the issue of air quality received top 
billing. Most of the public concern expressed at the public 
hearing involved the issue of air emissions, particularly 
sulfur dioxide. Fifty-two Missoula physicians and the 
Missoula City/County Health Department endorsed a two year 
delay while pollution control systems were installed and 
proven. Of all the criticism received by the DHES on the 
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Draft EIS, the comments of physicians and the Health 
Department were the only concerns which were directly 
addressed in the agency response to public comments section 
of the Final EIS. Instead of requiring a two year delay, 
the DHES proposed arant_ina. the expansion permi t . on the 
condition that new air quality monitoring and health studies 
would be conducted atHoerner-Waldorf's expense. When the 
Missoula City/County Health Department accepted these terms 
as "reasonable", the DHES made their final decision to grant 
the expansion permit. 
The issue of water quality and wastewater treatment was 
addressed by a^lowlji^ the company^ to proceed with the 
expansion on the /basis) that the new secondary aeration 
system, k1?S bleaching, Ln-^-plant spill control and the 
fr, )• 
experimental W^pid infiltration system would allow the 
expanded mill to meet the color standard. Essentially, the 
company was allowed to proceed with their preferred, least 
cost approach to wastewater treatment at their own risk. 
Despite significant public concerns over the pollution of 
groundwater resources, the DHES did not require H-W to 
provide sufficient data for the Final EIS to assure that no 
irreversible or irretrievable commitments of groundwater 
resources would occur to curtail future beneficial uses. 
Despite significant public concerns over the potential 
failure of the experimental rapid infiltration disposal 
system, the DHES required no analysis of alternatives to the 
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proposed action to address this contingency. The Final EIS 
merely stated that if the rapid infiltration system failed, 
an unspecified alternate means of treatment would be 
required. These deficiencies in the Final EIS contrasted 
markedly with the requirements of the Montana Environmental 
Policy Act. 
Following all of the arguments over the mill expansion, 
and whether it should be delayed for two years, the 
expansion permit was granted in 1974. Hoerner-Waldorf, 
ironically, then made the decision to delay the expansion 
until 1976 due to economic factors. The expansion was not 
complete until 1980. The Frenchtown pulp mill's expanded 
capacity of 1,850 tons per day and three paper machines made 
it one of the largest linerboard mills in the world. 
The mill had proceeded, meanwhile, to build its 
experimental rapid infiltration disposal system. By 1976, 
the mill had 120 acres of rapid infiltration basins in 
place, handling 63% of its wastewater disposal needs. Then, 
in 1977, the mill first noted that the basins were beginning 
to plug. Initial steps to solve the problem were 
unsuccessful. In 1983, the progressive failure of the rapid 
infiltration system forced the mill to seek an alternative 
means to dispose of its wastes. 
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CHAPTER 3 - BACKSLIDING, OR NONDEGRADATION? DECISION MAKING 
BY NEGOTIATION (1983-1986). 
By the time the facility's expansion was complete, 
secious plugging of the infiltration basins was noted by 
the pulp mill's technical staff. The "dose - dry" theory on 
which the disposal system was based was not proving 
workable. Under this theory, the mill would dose the 120 
acre rapid infiltration basins with effluent, and allow 
wastewater to percolate rapidly into gravel soils and the 
groundwater. Following each dosing period, the mill would 
allow the basins to thoroughly dry, theoretically preventing 
conditions under which anaerobic bacteria would thrive. The 
anaerobic conditions were believed to be the cause of 
bacterial growths in the basins' soils, which could cause 
them to plug. 
But despite the mill's attempts to prevent it, the 
basins were plugging rapidly. When operating efficiently in 
1976, before expansion, the basins allowed the disposal of 
63% of the mill's effluent. By 1983, the basins had become 
so badly clogged that only 30% of the mill's effluent could 
be disposed by rapid infiltration. The mill tried 
mechanical scarification of the basins, even attempted to 
open up the clogs with dynamite. But nothing worked. The 
experimental treatment system which was so heavily touted in 
the 1974 expansion permit proceedings was failing. 
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On July 22,1,9-82 Champion International Corporation, 
which acquired the mill through a merger with Hoerner 
Waldorf in 1977, applied for changes to their MPDES 
wastewater discharge permit. The mill requested permission 
to discharge wastewater year-round, and to increase the 
irc£ PO 
allowable disposal of total suspended solids 0(TSS) to 
million pounds per year, up from 2 million pounds per year. 
Water QualityJBureau Chief Steve Pilcher told the 
Missoulian that Champion's request would be thoroughly 
reviewed, followed by the issuance of a tentative decision. 
He said that the Bureau would provide a public notice of 
that tentative decision, and if there was enough public 
interest the Bureau would schedule a public hearing in 
Missoula. The whole process shouldn't take more than three 
months, Pilcher said. 
Champion's Technical Director Larry Weeks said that 
unless the state allowed the mill to begin discharging 
effluent to the river daily, the mill's 500 acre storage 
ponds would be full by January, 1984. As the ponds filled 
to capacity, seepage rates would increase causing possible 
color standard violations in the river. "If for some reason 
we get turned down, it's going to put us in a bind," Weeks 
said. Failure to solve the disposal problem could result in 
higher operating costs and potential production cutbacks at 
the mill, he said. 
Champion's request drew criticism from Richard 
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Konizeski, a former University of Montana Professor who 
served as a consultant to the Hoerner-Waldorf Corporation on 
groundwater studies in 1973. Konizeski had predicted at that 
time that the gravel basins would eventually clog. "I tried 
every way I could to make them see the light. There is no 
way on God's green earth that anything could happen to them 
but plug up," Konizeski stated in an interview with the 
Missoulian in August, 1983. Unfortunately, Konizeski's 
contract with Hoerner-Waldorf had not allowed him to make 
his results available to the public, or to the state. The 
company had apparently ignored his arguments. 
The 1974 Final EIS granting permission to Hoerner 
Waldorf to expand its mill stated that if the rapid 
infiltration system failed, "an alternate means of treatment 
would be required." The EIS discussed other forms of 
treatment, including lime and carbon systems, but failed to 
specify which form would be used. Despite the assurances of 
the 1974 EIS, Water Quality Bureau Chief Pilcher told the 
Missoulian that he considered Champion's proposal to be a 
suitable form of treatment. "It depends on your definition 
of treatment," J^ilcher said, claiming that dilution of 
wastes in the river was acceptable as long as .state water 
quality standards were met. 
On October 10, 1983, the Department of Health and 
Environmental Sciences produced a public notice, stating the 
Department's intention to modify Champion International's 
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MPDES permit. "The permit modification is being requested 
because of a very significant decrease in the capacity of 
the rapid infiltration system to treat effluent," DHES said. 
The Department made a tentative determination to allow most 
of Champion's requested permit modifications, allowing year-
round discharge of wastewater to the Clark Fork as long as 
river flows were sufficient to prevent state standards 
violations, and increasing allowable discharges of TSS from 
The Department scheduled a public hearing for November 
10, 1983, at the Missoula City Council Chambers. A 3 page 
Preliminary Environmental Review was provided by the 
Department to substantiate its decision. The document 
included a summary of findings, but no specific data was 
included to inform the reader of how those findings were 
reached. 
What happened next came as a surprise to nearly all 
observers, on both sides of the issue. Opposition to the 
proposal took shape quickly. Downstream residents, local 
and state governments, sportsmen groups, environmentalists 
and the Flathead Tribal Council all came out with a stinging 
attack on the plan. The Department of Health and 
Environmental Sciences was somewhat taken aback. The pulp 
mill permit and others in the state had been routinely re­
issued or revised with minor modifications in the past. Why 
did this proposal attract so much attention? The history of 
2 million pounds 
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controversy over wastewater discharges at the mill may have 
had something to do with it. 
The Mineral County Commissioners passed a unanimous 
resolution opposing Champion's request for increased waste 
dumping, and agreed to consider a lawsuit to prevent the 
permit from going through. Commissioner Mary Kay Noonen 
said, "We are trying to organize because (the waste water) 
will all come through Mineral County," downstream of the 
mill, "And that to us is just going to destroy our water 
supplies." County Commission Chairman Tom Marvin said 
Champion was proposing "to abuse a public resource. My 
biggest argument with the request is you have an industry 
that is not being responsible,... and it's getting away with 
it." 
Marvin said an Environmental Impact Statement was 
needed to analyze the proposal and address the concerns of 
local residents. But Bureau Chief Steve Pilcher said, "We 
have no reason to believe that the information submitted by 
Champion is not factual and accurate. I hate to be so cold 
as to say we can't afford to do an EIS to satisfy the 
concerns of everyone. But in all honesty, that's sort of 
what it boils down to." 
The State of Idaho also blasted the mill's proposal. 
In a letter to Montana Governor Ted Schwinden, Idaho 
Governor John Evans asked that increased dumping by Champion 
be delayed until the effects of the mill's pollution on the 
river and Idaho's Lake Pend Oreille were thoroughly studied. 
The call for further study and an Environmental Impact 
Statement was joined by the Montana Environmental 
Information Center and the Westslope Chapter of Trout 
Unlimited. 
On the day before the state's hearing, Missoula 
City/County Health Department officials charged that the 
Water Quality Bureau had failed to properly review 
Champion's plan. Environmental Health Director Elaine Bild 
and Pollution Control Specialist Jim Carlson claimed that, 
"The original (1974) EIS conclusion and subsequent expansion 
permits issued by several state agencies gave the pulp mill 
permission to expand, as long as the major components of air 
and water discharges did not increase. The original 
expansion EIS was nearly disapproved by the Department of 
Health, and the discharge limits were agreed upon by the 
pulp mill management as a condition to obtain the expansion 
permit." 
The Missoula Health Department also claimed that the 
Water Quality Bureau's tentative decision would be in 
violation of the state's nondegradation policy, which 
requires that existing high quality waters be maintained at 
that high quality "unless it has been affirmatively 
demonstrated to the board that a change is justifiable as a 
result of necessary economic or social development and will 
not preclude present and anticipated use of these waters;" 
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The Health Department concluded that, "The Water 
Quality Bureau should not allow any increase in the 
permitted discharge of any pollutant without affirmative 
direction from the State Board of Health." 
Carlson and Bild also pointed out that the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act stated, "It is the national goal 
that the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters be 
eliminated by 1985." The Bureau's endorsement of increased 
discharge was contrary to the goal of federal law, they 
stated. 
Glenn Phillips, pollution control biologist for the 
Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, also 
criticized Champion's plans, claiming the increased 
discharge could reduce oxygen levels in the river, increase 
suspended solids and possibly taint the taste of fish below 
the mill. 
Bureau Chief Steve Pilcher compJlained before the 
hearing that critics were being too emotional, and not 
specific in their objections. He said the issue would be 
decided on the facts, and not the number of critics. "We're 
not really playing a numbers' game. This is not a popularity 
contest. We must have a solid basis for this decision," he 
said. 
Champion Spokesman Bob Kelly bristled at the objections 
of opponents, "Critics talk about more studies," he said. 
"Nobody is really saying what they want to be studied." 
83 
Kelly claimed that the nondegradation policy did not 
apply to Champion's request, because it was part of the 
Water Quality Act and the request was filed under the 
Montana Pollution Discharge Elimination System. 
Bob Helding, of the Montana Wood Products Association, 
told The Missoulian, "If it wasn't for the chips sold to 
Champion these last two or three years, Montana's wood 
products industry would have been on its knees." Economic 
development interests and those employed in the wood 
products industry expressed fears that the waste-disposal 
problems at the pulp mill would produce a negative ripple 
effect throughout the state if the mill were forced to 
curtail production. 
By the time the Department of Health and Environmental 
Sciences held their public hearing on November 10. it seemed 
that 27 years of festering discontent over pollution control 
at the Frenchtown pulp mill was about to explode. Over 300 
citizens from three states packed into the City Council 
Chambers for that hearing, which all parties point to as a 
pivotal event in the permit controversy. Busloads of Idaho 
and Washington residents arrived for the hearing, and the 
Chambers became so crowded that many would-be participants 
were turned away at the doors. 
The hearing was lengthy, and often heated, as opponents 
chastised the Department for their decision to allow the 
increased dumping, and criticized the company for using 
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"scare tactics" to push the plan through. Technical issues 
were also raised by critics. Greg Munther, representing the 
Westslope Chapter of Trout Unlimited, claimed the Clark Fork 
was already under stress, and that the Bureau had not 
adequately addressed the possible effects of allowing 
increased dumping. He cited a fish kill during the previous 
summer, below Frenchtown, as an indicator that the river 
might be reaching a critical threshold. Vicki Watson, 
associate professor of Botany and Environmental Studies at 
the University of Montana, claimed that the Bureau lacked 
information to prove that the river would not be harmed by 
the increased discharge. She argued that those requesting 
the change in permit conditions should have the burden to 
prove that their proposal would not damage the river, that 
the citizens should not be required to prove that it would. 
Champion officials claimed their plan would protect the 
river, but hinted that if the plan was rejected, jobs would 
be lost. 
The hearing was interrupted repeatedly by shouting 
episodes, lengthy periods of applause and gavel pounding by 
the hearing officer. 
Mineral County Commissioner Marvin blasted the State, 
"We're not just talking about the future of the Clark Fork 
River," he said. "We're talking about the credibility of the 
Department of Health and Environmental Sciences." 
Champion's request was also criticized by the U.S. 
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Forest Service, Missoula County Commissioners, Missoula 
City/County Health Board, Bonner County, Idaho 
Commissioners, and others. 
Mill Manager Dan Potts said if the plan was rejected it 
would impose more costs on the mill, making it harder for 
them to compete in national markets. That, he said, could 
cost jobs. "It's important to our employees, the wood 
products industry of western Montana, and the community of 
Missoula that we stay competitive." The mill's annual 
payroll was about $20.7 million. 
The jobs issue caused state representative Joe Hammond 
of Alberton to bristle, "The strongest argument they have is 
that if we don't agree with what they want, then, by God, 
they'll cut off our jobs. Its do it our way or we'll take 
our ball and go home," he said. 
This historic hearing sent the permit issue into a 
tailspin. The process that was originally thought to take 
only three months now had no end in sight. And the event 
also lit a fire of public interest on behalf of the 
beleaguered Clark Fork River and Lake Pend Oreille. Active 
conservationists of the time did not anticipate that such a 
broad-based outpouring of supporters for the river and lake 
would come out of the woodwork for such a hearing. The 
opposition had gained an undeniable momentum. 
Just as quickly as the momentum had appeared, however, 
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the opponents suffered new setbacks. On November 14, the 
Missoula City Council refused to pass a resolution opposing^ 
the increased waste dumping. The vote was six to four. 
Ward 4 alderman John Toole called the resolution 
"harassment^ of Champion and the wood products industry.^" 
And on November 28, Montana Governor Schwinden TcejxSJCX^^r--
Idaho Governor Evan'_s_ request for further study of the 
mill's effects on the river and Lake Pend Oreille. 
Schwinden wrote, in a letter to Evans, "The concerns you 
expressed, along with the concerns of many others, are being 
evaluated by the Department of Health and Environmental 
Sciences." Schwinden enclosed with his letter a copy of 
Montana's water quality standards, which he said exceeded 
Idaho's in many respects. "I suggest that you compare these 
limitations with any similar mills which you have in Idaho," 
he wrote. 
But on December 6, 1983, opponents of the expanded 
discharge received good news from the Water Quality Bureau. 
Bureau Chief Steve Pilcher announced that an expanded 
environmental review of Champion's request would be 
prepared. He admitted that the Bureau had erred in its 
initial review, "One of the mistakes - for lack of a better 
word - we made is that we did not provide for review by the 
general public a summary of the information we used to back 
up our preliminary determination," he said. Pilcher did not 
indicate that the Bureau's recommendation would change, but 
said that the expanded review would address the fears of 
citizens about effects on the river and Lake Pend Oreille. 
"It may not be to their satisfaction," he said. "But we will 
answer their concerns to the best of our ability." 
Meanwhile, Champion began to backpedal on its assertion 
that their waste storage ponds would be filled to capacity 
by mid-January unless the state granted their request to 
discharge daily into the Clark Fork. Mill Spokesman Bob 
Kelly told The Missoulian that they now had several 
additional weeks of storage in the 500 acre pond complex. 
Critics began to wonder how much of an emergency this really 
was for Champion. 
The DHES completed an expanded Preliminary 
Environmental Review document in mid-January, 1984, which 
provided further data to substantiate their tentative 
decision and determined that a full environmental impact 
statement was not warranted. But it released the document 
only to the state Environmental Quality Council and a few 
other organizations. This action angered environmentalists. 
During a heated meeting in Helena, Tom Daubert, of the 
Montana Environmental Information Center, claimed, "The 
state is clearly trying to keep the public out." WQB Chief 
Steve Pilcher claimed his agency had exceeded state 
requirements for public involvement, and that critics could 
spend their time more productively by reviewing the document 
than by complaining about the process. Daubert claimed that 
the state should have provided a copy of the PER to all 
interested parties, including the 300 people who attended 
the November, 1983 hearing. Pilcher denied that this was 
required, or warranted. 
Despite the claim that critics should review the PER, 
the state announced that its final decision would be made 
about one week following release of the PER, and that 
DHES rules did not require another public comment period or 
hearing. The Environmental Information Center decided to 
hold their own informational hearing on the PER if the state 
failed to do so. 
The state's PER narrowed the focus of their decision to 
the terms of the proposed permit modification, rather than 
the impact of the entire wastewater disposal system. This 
interpretation was not popular with critics, whose comments 
at the November hearing related primarily to the long-term 
impacts of the pulp mill's discharge, rather than the change 
that might result from increasing that discharge. The DHES 
claimed, in the PER, that most of the public's concerns 
"could not be supported by scientific documentation." 
However, in response to public concerns about inadequate 
knowledge of the river and the mill's impact, the PER 
outlined an expanded monitoring program, which would be 
partially supported by the mill and would be required 
regardless of the state's decision to modify the permit 
(DHES, 1984). 
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In response to a "significant public reaction", the 
DHES reversed its plans to proceed with a decision on the 
permit within a week after the release of the PER* and 
announced that their decision would be delayed for thirty 
days to allow public review and comment. WQB Chief Steve 
Pilcher stated that all public comments would be taken into 
account before the final decision was issued. 
From the Water Quality Bureau's perspective the process 
was beginning to bog down. The Bureau's staff had been 
engaged in a review of the mill's proposal since July, 1983, 
and in their professional judgement the proposal would not 
constitute a significant impact to the environment. Under 
these circumstances, they believed, they should not be 
required to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement. 
Public participation requirements for preliminary 
environmental reviews were being met or exceeded. The 
Bureau seemed to have great difficulty accepting all the 
public criticism over what was, to them, a routine decision 
which was well within their authority. 
But the fact remained that the public had raised 
significant questions about the potential impacts of the 
proposed decision. Many of these questions could not be 
fully answered with available information. Conservation 
groups were demanding additional review periods, and holding 
their own hearings. The Flathead Tribal Council joined the 
fray by requesting a full EIS, due to potential affects on 
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fishing rights guaranteed in the Hellgate Treaty of 1855. 
The process was beginning to look much more like an 
Environmental Impact Statement process with its requirements 
for full analysis of alternatives, public review periods and 
pubic hearings. Even the PER document itself was starting 
to look like an EIS in PER's clothing, stretching in length 
to 50 pages and covering much of the subject material 
necessary for an EIS. But for whatever reason, be it staff 
and budget restrictions, or bureaucratic inertia, the state 
resisted all requests to prepare an official EIS. 
Confounding the public's perception of this stance, state 
regulations allowed the Bureau to charge the industry for 
the costs of an Impact Statement, but the expense of the PER 
came out of the Bureau's already tight budget. 
Public discussion of the permit issue continued despite 
the lack of an official governmental process, and the 
Environmental Information Center held their promised public 
forum on February 9, 1984. The meeting did not constitute a 
public hearing under the law, but WQB Chief Steve Pilcher 
and mill representatives did attend, and the public was 
allowed further opportunity to express their concerns. 
Steve Pilcher claimed that the goal of the Clean Water Act, 
to eliminate all sources of pollution to surface waters, was 
just a goal and not a requirement of law. Vicki Watson 
argued that such statutory g^l^sh5ul<3 tell state agencies 
which direction they ought to be going, even if the ultimate 
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goal was not judged to be practical. She claimed that the 
Bureau's decision was contrary to the goal of the Clean 
Water Act, because allowing increased discharge meant we 
were going in the wrong direction. 
The Department of Health and Environmental Sciences 
delayed an announcement of their final decision past the 
February 21 deadline. Mill officials announced that 
emergency pond storage expansions would allow them to 
accommodate all of their wastes, without production 
cutbacks, until the normal spring runoff discharge period in 
May. 
The decision-making process was at a standstill. The 
state's original plan to act within three months had now 
dragged on for seven months. The opponents had demanded, 
and received additional information, review periods and 
public meetings. But the process used by the Water Quality 
Bureau had failed to satisfy public concerns. The problem 
of rapid infiltration had been inadequately addressed in the 
1974 EIS, and was still not being confronted squarely 
through a careful analysis of alternatives in 1983. ^The 
Bureau had chosen to work within a decision-making process 
which limited public involvement and consideration of 
alternatives. Although they clearly believed this was 
justified under the law, it only raised public fears and 
suspicions and fostered further confrontation. When 
opponents won concessions allowing further review and 
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comment, many responded with harsh criticism and stern 
allegations. The first public hearing turned into a 
shouting match and grandstanding event as contestants vied 
to see who could put on the best show in public. Conflicts 
were perpetuated by the process, rather than resolved. 
The stalemate was broken in March, 1984 when a 
coalition of environmental, property owner and sportsmen 
groups, including the Westslope Chapter of Trout Unlimited, 
National Wildlife Federation, Lake Pend Oreille Shoreline 
Owners Association, and the Montana Environmental 
Information Center, initiated discussions with Champion 
International Corporation to resolve the eight-month old 
dispute. 
The groups were represented by Missoula attorneys Karl 
Englund, Tom France and Bill Rossbach, Sandpoint attorney 
Steve Herndon, and Vicki Watson, serving as a technical 
advisor. Englund and Rossbach were instrumental, one year 
earlier, in negotiating a $1.6 million settlement for the 
construction of powerlines across Rock Creek, a blue ribbon 
trout stream east of Missoula. 
Following lengthy negotiations, a Memorandum of Agreement 
was signed by the parties which would allow the 
mill's increased discharge to occur for a period of two 
years while intensive studies were performed on the effects 
of the discharge on the river and Lake Pend Oreille. 
The Conservation groups agreed not to fight the 
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increased dumping or to initiate legal action during the two 
year period. Champion agreed to contribute $100,000 toward 
studies of the river and its fishery. The conservation 
groups also agreed to contribute funds for the studies, and 
a special "Technical Advisory Committee" would be formed 
with 12 representatives of industry, government and citizen 
groups to guide the studies. An Environmental Impact 
Statement was called for following the completion of the 
studies, in 1986, prior to a state decision on a renewed, 
five-year permit for increased waste discharge. A Water 
Quality Bureau representative attended one of the last 
negotiating sessions, when requested, although they would 
not actively participate in the discussions. When the 
negotiating parties called for the EIS, the Bureau agreed. 
The negotiated settlements for both the Rock Creek 
powerlines and the pulp mill permit were a new form of 
public involvement in conservation issues in Montana. The 
negotiations followed lengthy periods of heightened 
controversy, with ample expressions of grassroots 
involvement. But the discussions themselves were handled by 
a small group of representatives from both sides. The 
conservation groups were represented primarily by their 
attorneys. 
In each case, the settlement was made possible by the 
public controversy surrounding the industry proposal, and 
the perceived likelihood that the proposal could be 
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rejected. 
The 1984 pulp mill settlement received some criticism 
from the rank and file of conservation groups and other 
downstream residents, who perceived it as an exchange of 
cash for approval of the increased dumping. The Flathead 
Tribal Council was particularly harsh in their criticism of 
the settlement. But most of the opponents of the increased 
discharge seemed pleased with the terms of the agreement 
which required intensive study of the mill's impact, and 
called for the preparation of an EIS before permit renewal 
in two years. 
But for those who were closely involved in the 1974 
expansion controversy, and who remembered the pledges 
regarding the rapid infiltration system's potential failure, 
the settlement was just another postponement of a decision 
to install a treatment system which could handle production 
from the expanded mill. 
The Water Quality Bureau did not participate in the 
talks, and mainta i ned that their decision would not 
necessarily be influenced by any agreements. "It's great 
anytime we can minimize the conflict or differences in 
opinion that might exist between industry and 
environmentalists," Bureau Chief Pilcher said at the time. 
But he maintained that the authority and the responsibility 
to make the decision still rested with the Water Quality 
Bureau. "I do not think it's appropriate for a state agency 
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with the legal responsibility for decision-making to 
participate in this kind of an agreement. It might smack of 
a deal," he said. 
Nonetheless, after the agreement had been reached, the 
Water Quality Bureau scrutinized the plan and found it to be 
consistent with the laws and regulations it was charged to 
uphold. On April 6, 1984, Department of Health and 
Environmental Sciences Director John Drynan presented a two 
year permit for increased waste discharge to Champion 
International Mill Manager Dan Potts. He publicly announced 
that the state would commit $200,000 toward intensive river 
studies, and that an Environmental Impact Statement would be 
prepared before the company's discharge permit could be 
renewed. In addition, a fishery study would be conducted by 
the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks with $100,000 
from the company. Both studies would be reviewed by a 
Technical Advisory Committee supported by the company and 
the conservation groups. Finally,.Champion International 
Corporation was required to initiate an engineering 
evaluation of alternative wastewater treatment technologies 
during the two year period, and all of these studies would 
be used in the EIS. 
Despite the high degree of public controversy during 
the previous eight months, only a small audience turned out 
for the announcement of the state's decision on the final 
permit. Most of the audience consisted of news media 
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reporters and government officials. 
Conservationists wondered if the same level of public 
interest would be there when the permit came up for renewal 
in 1986. 
TWO YEARS OF SCRUTINY 
The state Water Quality Bureau launched its intensive 
studies of the Clark Fork and the effects of mill wastes in 
the spring of 1984. As part of the studies set forth in the 
1984 memorandum of agreement and discharge permit, 
biologists gathered information on a variety of water 
quality parameters and fisheries populations in a 120 mile 
stretch of river from above the Milltown Dam, east of 
Missoula, to the Idaho border. 
Although most people agreed that the studies would 
provide valuable information about the river and the mill's 
effects, biologists claimed that their usefulness might be 
limited. Rod Berg, coordinator of the Clark Fork fisheries 
study with the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, said 
the studies "don't represent a final solution. This is not 
something we'll fully understand in two years." 
According to Vicki Watson, aquatic ecologist at the 
University of Montana, one of the most significant 
compromises the conservation groups made in signing the 1984 
memorandum of agreement was to give up their demand for one 
or two years of baseline studies before the increased 
discharge began. The groups reluctantly settled for studies 
which would be conducted during the increased discharge 
period, but expressed strong reservations about the 
limitations of such an approach. The Water Quality Bureau's 
original statement of objectives for the studies stated that 
they would determine whether there were changes in the river 
as a result of the increased discharge. But Watson claimed 
that a change could not be documentedwithout adequate data 
prior to the commencement of increased discharges. She 
warned the Bureau that the nondegradation issue would 
ultimately have to be addressed, and the studies would not 
allow the Bureau to document changes in the river. Still, 
Watson and the conservation groups believed the studies 
would be helpful, and would give them a better idea of 
impacts than they had before. 
Watson also criticized the inability of the studies to 
test the limits of the mill's new permit. River flows and 
water temperatures were about average during 1984, the first 
summer of discharge under the new permit. Watson claimed 
that problems from the increased discharge would be worse 
when river flows were low and temperatures high. Because 
the color standard limited its discharge in 1985, a low flow 
year, the mill was discharging wastes during the summer at 
only a l-to-3,000 dilution ratio with river water, although 
permit limits could allow ratios as high as l-to-200. 
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Champion Spokesman Bob Kelly claimed, "From our 
perspective, it was as anticipated. We weren't expecting 
any significant or deleterious effects on the river when we 
made the application for the permit." The company said the 
numerous restrictions on its permit would insure that the 
river would be protected. 
But Watson said the purpose of the studies was to 
assess the full effect of the permit changes, "If they're 
not going to test the permit at that level (1:200 dilution), 
then let's rewrite the permit," she said. 
Richard Solberg, chairman of the technical advisory 
committee (TAC) established by the memorandum of agreement, 
also claimed that two years of study may not be enough. "We 
need 10 years of study, not two," he said. The TAC began 
meeting to monitor the conduct of state studies in May, 
following the issuance of the two year permit. After the 
studies had progressed for two years, Solberg acknowledged 
that, "It's true that no massive detrimental effect has been 
seen so far. But a river ecosystem is so variable and 
dynamic that long-term research is necessary," he said. 
The TAC continued to meet about every two months to 
review the design of the studies, assess their results, and 
to discuss the content of the upcoming EIS. Discussions 
were at times lively, with considerable differences of 
opinion over many issues, especially nutrient loading, 
nondegradation policy issues, and the analysis of 
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alternatives in the upcoming EIS. But despite the 
differences of opinion, the TAC format allowed considerable 
sharing of information and ideas. The level of 
communication established between the various parties in the 
issue was unprecedented. Some committee members, 
particularly those from the conservation groups, were 
frustrated at times by the lack of authority vested in the 
TAC. Although the Bureau adopted many of the TAC's 
suggestions for changes in the studies, the committee's 
advice and requests of information to the state Water 
Quality Bureau were not always heeded. The committee did 
not act as a board in a decision making process, voting on 
various issues as they arose. The TAC's meetings were, 
instead, free wheeling events where information was 
presented by various investigators and ideas expressed by 
any committee member who wished to do so. 
Many conservationists had the mistaken impression that 
the TAC would provide some sort of watchdog role over the 
pulp mill issue. This was not the case. But the committee 
did provide the valuable contribution of increasing the 
communication among the various parties, and enhancing the 
understanding of each others concerns and positions. This 
alone would prove to be quite valuable in the months ahead. 
As it became clear that the TAC would not fulfill a 
watchdog role, a number of citizen watchdog groups took 
shape during 1985, including two groups of "River Watchers" 
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in Plains and Noxon. The river watchers took an unusual 
approach to citizen participation, by actively assisting in 
the monitoring of water quality and the effects of the pulp 
mill. Water Quality Bureau scientists Loren Bahls and Gary 
Ingman went out of their way to instruct these groups in the 
use of water quality monitoring equipment. Volunteers spent 
many hours of their own time collecting data on the river, 
and this information was ultimately used in the preparation 
of the state's EIS in 1986. 
The river watchdog group which ultimately played the 
most pivotal role in the pulp mill issue also took shape in 
1985. The Clark Fork Coalition provided a basin-wide 
alliance of individuals, conservation and sportsmen groups 
and businesses who were committed to improving the quality 
of the Clark Fork River. The Coalition was interested in 
many issues along the river, including toxic waste cleanup 
at Superfund sites, mining proposals and dam reconstruction. 
But the pulp mill was the smoking gun that got the group 
organized, uniting citizens and groups from three states 
over the issue of water quality protection. The group would 
attract contributions of valuable technical expertise and 
volunteer energy, and become a force to be reckoned with in 
the permit renewal proceedings. 
Like the citizens of the Clark Fork Coalition, the 
state was coming to view the river as an entire basin. 
Montana Governor Ted Schwinden created the Clark Fork River 
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Basin Project to help coordinate long-range, comprehensive 
studies of the river, on April 30, 1984. In announcing the 
"unprecedented state effort", Schwinden said the project 
would create a basin-wide data base, make the most out of 
scarce study dollars, and examine all potential impacts on 
the river in a coordinated manner. The Clark Fork River 
Basin Project established an interagency task force, made up 
of all state, local and federal agencies conducting work on 
the river, and a citizens' advisory council, made up of 
civic leaders, industry representatives and some 
conservationists. The pulp mill studies and EIS would 
provide a focal point of discussions. 
The Frenchtown pulp mill and the Clark Fork River had 
never received such attention and active, public discussion 
in its history. With so many official review committees and 
"blue ribbon" panels scrutinizing the issues, the general 
public was understandably confused as to what was being 
accomplished. 
By September, 1985, the Water Quality Bureau had 
collected the last sets of data to be used in the 
environmental review, and began preparing its EIS. Champion 
officials requested a five-year extension of their expanded 
discharge permit, claiming that the results of the past 18 
months of study indicated no detrimental effects on the 
Clark Fork River or Lake Pend Oreille. 
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STATE RELEASES DRAFT EIS 
The Montana Department of Health and Environmental 
Sciences released its Draft EIS on the pulp mill discharge 
permit on December 24, 1985, and recommended that Champion 
International Corporation be allowed to continue discharging 
wastes into the Clark Fork under the terms of their current, 
two year permit. Water Quality Bureau Chief Steve Pilcher 
said that the studies performed since 1984 had shown no ill 
effects on the river. "The assessment during the two year 
period does not bear out the fears that were raised," he 
said. DHES scheduled a public hearing for January 28, in 
Missoula, to take public comments on the Draft EIS. 
Public response to the Draft EIS was slow to 
materialize. The Clark Fork Coalition assumed a 
coordinating role for citizen review of the document, 
establishing an independent review committee, and sponsoring 
two public forums in Sandpoint and Missoula prior to the 
January 28 hearing. But the Coalition was unwilling to 
issue a hasty response. 
By mid-January, DHES officials were puzzled by the lack 
of public reaction. "We have had surprisingly little 
feedback on the draft Environmental Impact Statement," 
Pilcher told a meeting of the Environmental Quality Council. 
"I'm not sure of the reasons why." 
Tom France, National Wildlife Federation attorney and 
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EQC member, speculated that people were no longer angry 
about being locked out of the decision-making process. "Now 
maybe they aren't as confused about the process," he said. 
France's assessment seems to have been correct. Citizens no 
longer felt the need to vocalize criticisms about the 
decision-making process because they knew they would have 
the opportunity to respond to the draft EIS with written 
comments and with testimony at the January 28 hearing. 
State rules for Environmental Impact Statements would 
require their comments to be considered, and responded to in 
a final EIS. The Clark Fork Coalition and its member 
organizations were busy reviewing the draft EIS and two 
large volumes of supporting data, and preparing their 
response. 
But the attitude of conservationists could not be 
portrayed as one of enthusiasm. Members of the Clark Fork 
Coalition actually felt the situation looked pretty bleak. 
Both the Water Quality Bureau and the mill seemed 
entrenched, and determined to prove that their initial 
prediction of no significant impact in 1983 was true. There 
seemed to be an insurmountable wall of data and politics 
between conservationists and their goal of improving the 
river by tightening the pulp mill's permit. 
But the Coalition continued its review of the draft EIS 
and uncovered significant bodies of information ommitted in 
the document, including a lack of discussion of a full range 
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of alternatives, the nondegradation policy, future 
monitoring requirements, fisheries data, and an assessment 
of the economic values of the river and lake for tourism, 
recreation and quality of life values. 
The Coalition was especially firm in its criticism of 
the lack of discussion of alternatives in the draft EIS. The 
Montana Environmental Policy Act required a full analysis of 
a range of alternatives x to the proposed action. But the 
draft EIS jDresentedJonlyy three/ alternatives to the public 
for review, 1) to den^Bre~p^rmitT^r^PProv^the permit as 
proposed, and 3) modify the permit by including unspecified, 
additional conditions. During a January 21 public forum on 
the permit issue, the Coalition claimed that alternative 1, 
to deny the permit, was not a realistic alternative, and had 
never been suggested by anyone. Alternative 3, the CFC 
maintained, could have merit, but the DHES did not discuss 
what modifications might be considered under this 
alternative. Therefore, the public had no opportunity to 
provide substantive comments on alternative 3, and the only 
choice left was to approve the permit as proposed. 
As written, the draft EIS focused on the compilation of 
18 months of studies by various agencies and groups. The 
CFC claimed that, "The DEIS should include a thorough 
discussion of the full range of alternatives, including 
alternative treatment technologies, and an assessment of the 
relative costs and benefits of each." The CFC called for a 
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complete re-drafting of the EIS. "The alternatives should 
then be presented again to the public for review, including 
a public hearing in Missoula, before the WQB adopts a final 
EIS with a preferred alternative for action." 
The Governor's Citizen Advisory Council met on January 
22, the day after the Coalition's forum, to review the draft 
EIS, and the discussion again focused on the issue of 
alternatives. Following lengthy debate, the Council adopted 
a motion calling for "further review of alternatives for 
public and industry to comment on prior to a hearing on the 
EIS." Specifically, the Council called for "more options 
under Alternative number 3." 
On the day before the state's January 28 hearing, the 
Water Quality Bureau again came under fire from the Missoula 
City/County Health Department and others for their handling 
of the draft EIS. The Health Department's pollution control 
specialist, Jim Carlson, criticized the Bureau as he had in 
1983. "Our biggest concerns are the Water Quality Bureau 
and the way they've handled this," he said. Missoula 
Attorney Karl Englund, a member of the Governor's Citizen 
Advisory Council, renewed the criticism of the Bureau's 
inadequate discussion of alternatives. "That's a very, very 
important part," of the EIS, Englund said. 
Bureau Chief Steve Pilcher responded by stating that 
the purpose of the EIS was to provide a summary of the 
various studies made during the past 18 months, and that 
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public comments would be used to revise the report. 
STATE HOLDS HEARING ON DRAFT EIS 
About 300 concerned citizens arrived for the state's 
January 28 public hearing in Missoula. Water Quality Bureau 
Chief Steve Pilcher opened the hearing by noting that the 
respectable crowd indicated a continued, strong public 
interest in the water quality of the Clark Fork River. He 
summarized the findings of the 18 month study of the river, 
and reiterated his claim that the purpose of the Draft EIS 
was to compile the data used by the agency in making their 
tentative decision on the permit issue. He said that public 
comments would be used to revise the report, if necessary, 
and that a final EIS would be prepared before formally 
proposing permit conditions for the mill. The public would 
have a chance to review the conditions at that time, he 
said, noting that further alternatives could be discussed 
throughout the process. 
The hearing audience listened as the state 
Environmental Quality Council unexpectedly criticized the 
draft EIS. Resource specialist Hugh Zackheim claimed, "The 
abbreviated discussion of alternatives is insufficient 
to meet the intent of the law." Zackheim noted, "In 
presenting the department's options to deny, approve or 
modify the permit, the text does not indicate what legal 
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criteria apply. This could be an appropriate place for a 
discussion of state water quality standards and the 
nondegradation law, and how the department uses these 
statutes in its analysis of policy options." 
"The upcoming public notice and decision process on the 
actual wastewater discharge permit does not relieve the 
department of the obligation to fully present and analyze 
the proposed action in the EIS. An EIS is not intended to be 
just a compilation of studies: rather, it must provide the 
public with as complete an understanding as practical of the 
proposed action," Zackheim said. 
The Environmental Quality Council called for a thorough 
treatment of the alternatives in a draft EIS supplement or a 
revised DEIS. Without such action, the EQC said, the draft 
EIS would not meet the obligations imposed by the Montana 
Environmental Policy Act. 
The EQC's call for a revised draft EIS was joined by 
the Missoula City/County Health Department, the Clark Fork 
Coalition and others. Howard Johnson, representing the 
Governor's Citizens' Advisory Council, disappointed council 
members by failing to present the statement developed at its 
last meeting, calling for more analysis of alternatives. 
The Citizens' Advisory Council never met again. 
The Technical Advisory Committee presented a list of 
unresolved concerns including data gaps, frequency of 
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monitoring, length of the mill's mixing zone, toxic 
substances and other important issues. The TAC did not seem 
to agree that the draft EIS gave the increased discharge a 
clean bill of health. 
DHES announced that the public review and comment 
period would be extended for 30 additional days, to February 
28. But they had heard so much of the same kind of comment 
from conservation groups, other agencies and advisory 
groups, that the outcome was pretty well understood before 
the hearing officer's gavel closed the January public 
hearing. The Draft EIS would need a major overhaul. The 
only decision left to be made was how to accomplish it, and 
how to announce it. 
DHES and Schwinden Administration officials initiated 
earnest discussions of the problem following the public 
hearing. Talks focused on the manner in which the draft EIS 
could be shored up to meet legal requirements and satisfy 
public concerns. There was great reluctance to take the 
most drastic step called for by the Coalition and the EQC, 
to completely revise and reissue the draft EIS and start the 
process over. Such a move would certainly cause the DHES 
and the Administration much public embarrassment. Governor 
Schwinden had publicly claimed that protection and 
enhancement of the Clark Fork was a high priority of his 
administration when he announced the formation of the Clark 
Fork River Basin Project. And some officials were concerned 
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with establishing a precedent whereby the contents of a 
draft EIS could be totally rejected on procedural grounds. 
DHES and WQB officials seemed reluctant to replay the 
process glitches and delays experienced in the troubled 
times of 1983 and 1984. 
A complete draft EIS revision was not in the cards,. 
Officials deliberated plans for the preparation of an 
addendum to the existing document. 
CFC PRESENTS A "CITIZENS' ALTERNATIVE" 
While the DHES and Schwinden Administration 
contemplated their next move, the Coalition was busy 
studying the proposed permit and a range of available 
alternatives. The group formed its own advisory committee 
on the permit issue, and attracted the support of a wide 
range of volunteers. These included Vicki Watson, Greg 
Munther of Trout Unlimited, Ron Erickson of the University's 
Environmental Studies Department, Tom France of the Wildlife 
Federation, Marty Onishuk of the League of Women Voters, Jim 
Curtis of the Sierra Club, Dennis Workman of the Department 
of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, Peter Nielsen (CFC Director), 
and many others. On February 25 the group took the 
offensive and announced a Citizens' Alternative for the pulp 
mill's permit. 
The announcement came only days before the planned end 
of comment period on the draft EIS, and it caused the 
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Water Quality Bureau to hastily announce its own plans to 
prepare an addendum to the DEIS. The Coalition's proposal 
took officials by surprise, and backed up the group's claims 
of inadequate alternatives in the DEIS by presenting a 
specific set of well researched conditions for the mill's 
new permit. The Alternative was a well-reasoned compromise 
which called for the eventual rollback of the mill's permit 
conditions to those in effect before the controversy ignited 
in 1983. The Coalition quickly forced public debate to 
shift from the problems with the mill's proposal and the 
state's draft EIS to a very specific set of well documented 
proposals. 
Key provisions of the Citizens' Alternative included: 
- Issuance of a temporary five year permit with revised 
conditions, and a mid-term evaluation to consider 
possible permit changes based on information gathered 
in the meantime. 
- A return to the discharge limitations and permit 
conditions in effect before year-round discharge began 
in 1984, by no later than 1991. 
- Maintenance of the 2 million pound/year limitation on 
Total Suspended Solids, rather than expanding the 
allowable discharge to 4 million pounds per year. The 
TSS limitation would be calculated, however, on a 3 
year running average, with an absolute maximum of 2.5 
million pounds per year. This would allow some 
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additional discharge in years when river flow 
conditions allowed adequate dilution. 
- Maintaining the current 7.0 milligrams per liter 
(mg/1) instream dissolved oxygen threshold for cutoff 
of mill discharges, but allowing a maximum of just 1 
mg/1 reduction of DO in the river from above the mill 
to below its mixing zone. 
- a new limitation restricting the mill's discharge to 
periods when river water temperatures were below 65 
degrees F, to avoid additional stress on cold water 
fisheries. 
- A new limitation to reduce total nutrient loading 
(phosphorous and Nitrogen) to levels discharged prior 
to the 1984 permit modifications. 
The Citizens' Alternative stated, " We request that the 
Bureau begin with this permitting process to take an active 
rather than passive role to protect the Clark Fork River 
from further degradation and to use all of its available 
resources and imagination to develop a truly comprehensive 
water quality management policy for the Clark Fork River 
Basin." 
In response to the Coalition's Alternative, a Water 
Quality Bureau spokesman announced, "We are attempting to 
address some of what were perceived as deficiencies" by 
preparing an addendum to the Draft EIS. The Bureau had 
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already prepared a draft outline of the addendum, and in an 
effort to improve avenues for input, they circulated it to 
the members of the Technical Advisory Committee for review. 
The Coalition was also directly consulted about the content 
of the proposed addendum, and the Water Quality Bureau 
agreed to include the groups Citizens* Alternative in the 
document along with a range of other alternative actions. 
The Bureau also announced that they would include new 
sections in the addendum to describe the nondegradation 
policy and its effect on the proposed decision, and the 
economic benefits of clean water. The document would also 
include more data, including the previously omitted report 
on fisheries from the Department of Fish, Wildlife and 
Parks. 
NONDEGRADATION BECOMES THE FOCUS 
The Montana Water Quality Act had been enacted in 
1967, and amended in 1971 to include a strict policy 
intended to protect state waters from further water quality 
degradation: 
75-5-303 Nondegradation Policy. The Board shall 
require: (1) that any state waters whose existing water 
quality is higher than the established water quality 
standards be maintained at that high quality unless it 
has been affirmatively demonstrated to the board that a 
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change is justifiable as a result of necessary economic 
development and will not preclude present and 
anticipated uses of these waters, and (2) any 
industrial, public, or private project or development 
which would constitute a new source of pollution to 
high quality waters to provide the degree of waste 
treatment necessary to maintain that existing high 
water quality. 
In 1982, the Montana Board of Health and Environmental 
Sciences adopted administrative rules to implement this far 
reaching policy. These rules state: 
16.20.702 APPLICABILITY AND LIMITATION OF STATE WATER 
DEGRADATION -- GENERAL (1) The requirements of this 
sub-chapter apply to any activity of man which would 
cause a new or increased source of pollution to state 
waters. (2) If the Board determines, based on 
necessary economic or social development, that 
degradation may be allowed, in no event may degradation 
of state waters interfere with or become harmful, 
detrimental or injurious to public health, recreation, 
safety, welfare, livestock, wild birds, fish and other 
wildlife or other beneficial uses. 
16.20.703 PERMIT CONDITIONS TO ENSURE NONDEGRADATION 
(1) In Issuing a permit to a new or enlarged point 
source, the department shall include conditions in the 
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permit to ensure that the quality of receiving waters 
whose quality is higher than established water quality 
standards will not be degraded by the discharge of 
pollutants from the source. 
In Section 16.20.704 the Board established procedures 
under which a discharger may appeal specific limits imposed 
by the Department to ensure nondegradation, including a 
lengthy and comprehensive set of requirements for 
petitioning the Board for permit amendments. 
Once DHES made the decision to prepare an addendum to 
the Draft EIS, and to include a broader range of 
alternatives in the addendum, the Coalition shifted their 
focus. The group remained quite concerned about the type of 
alternatives DHES might present in the addendum. But their 
request to have the Citizens' Alternative included in the 
addendum was backed by numerous citizen groups and 
businesses along the river, and by other state agencies, 
including the Environmental Quality Council. The 
alternatives question seemed to be pretty well under control 
when DHES notified the Coalition that the Citizens' 
Alternative would be included in the addendum. The group 
then turned to another issue that could help them win 
approval of the Citizens' Alternative. That issue was 
nondegradation. 
The cornerstone of the Coalition's Citizens* 
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Alternative was the five-year objective to assure 
nondegradation. The new permit should return to the 
discharge conditions in effect prior to 1984, within five 
year's time, the group claimed. 
DHES released their addendum to the Draft EIS on March 
17, 1986. In announcing the release, Steve Pilcher stated, 
"While no one likes criticism, the comments (received at the 
January hearing) have helped us establish the level of 
information the public desires." The Department announced 
its plans to hold another public hearing on the addendum, on 
April 17. 
At this point the controversy began to focus for the 
first time on the legal issues surrounding state and federal 
nondegradation policy and state rules to implement that 
policy. 
Critics were generally pleased with the topics 
addressed by the Draft EIS addendum. The EQC's Hugh 
Zackheim said, "It's fair to say the original fell short. 
The addendum definitely meets the requirements of MEPA," he 
said. The Coalition also praised the beefed up content of 
the new document, stating in the April issue of its 
newsletter, Currents, "The document does a much more 
thorough job of presenting information and policy analysis 
which were not addressed in the first draft." 
The Addendum included the Citizens' Alternative as one 
of five choices for review. But the DHES recommended a 
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hybrid alternative, which incorporated some features of the 
Citizens' Alternative, and retained the main feature of the 
draft EIS preferred alternative which did not require the 
mill to return to former discharge levels or to replace the 
failing rapid infiltration system. Still, the Coalition was 
generally pleased that the DHES had agreed to provide a mid­
term review of the permit, and to require further monitoring 
and special studies of foam, nutrient loading and mixing 
zone length. The changes in the department's 
recommendations for action were viewed as positive 
developments in the whole process. The group was also 
pleased that DHES had included a section in the addendum 
spelling out the department's stand on nondegradation. But 
they differed markedly with the agency's stance and the 
reasoning behind it. 
ARE ALL WASTES INNOCENT UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY? 
In the concluding paragraph of the addendum's section 
on nondegradation, DHES stated, "Presently, there are no 
data to indicate that increased levels of nutrients 
(phosphorous and nitrogen) have caused . chan-ges-aO-he 
aquatic communities of the ClarTc Fork River or Lake Pend 
Oreille. Thus, it cannot be concluded that the present 
levels of nutrients have degraded either the river or the 
lake. If future monitoring shows that there are undesirable 
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changes in either the river of the lake, this permit and all 
other permits in the Clark Fork Basin will be revised to 
limit nutrient impacts." (DHES, 1986) 
The Coalition objected strongly to this reasoning, 
claiming it amounted to a policy of degradation, not 
nondegradation. In a special bulletin to Coalition members, 
the group's advisory committee members wrote, "(DHES) will 
do nothing to limit the mill's dumping until they see a 
problem in the river which is directly attributable to the 
mill. In other words, they will allow the_ degradation to 
occur first, then we can attempt to prove a cause and effect 
re1ationshto the waste discharge, and then DHES will 
think about doing something to fix the problem!" 
Federal and state nondegradation policy and regulations 
contained clear statements of intent to prevent degradation 
from occurring, not to allow it in the absence of difficult 
to obtain scientific proof. A 1985 EPA guidance document on 
anti-degradation (federal statutory language uses anti 
instead of nondegradation terminology) stated, j^sTnc^) such 
activities (new dischargers or expansion of existing 
dischargers) would presumably lower water quality, they 
would not be permissable unless the state finds that it is 
necessary to accommodate important economic or social 
development." (EPA, 1985) This differed markedly from DHES' 
interpretation that they must first prove that the 
degradation had already occurred before restricting the 
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increased discharge. EPA guidance also stated. "The burden 
of demonstration on the individual pr oposjjij^ ty 
will be very high," contrasting to the DHES interpretation 
that the burden of proof was on the citizens or the aqerjcy. 
Vicki Watson, speaking at the Coalition's annual meeting in 
March, 1986, reiterated her claim that the mill should 
demonstrate that the increased discharge was not harmful. 
"The burden of proof should be on them to justify the 
change, not on the citizens to justify keeping things the 
same," she said. 
Critics claimed that by placing the burden of proof on 
the citizens, DHES would almost certainly assure that 
increased discharges of pollutants would occur at the mill 
and other permitted facilities. Watson claimed that 
inadequate baseline data on river conditions, and highly 
variable flow and weather conditions, would severely limit 
anyone's ability to prove that a moderate increase in 
pollutant loading had caused a measurable effect on the 
river. Systems like the Clark Fork are large and highly 
variable from year to year, and it is difficult, if not 
impossible to blame one source of pollutants for a change in 
water quality data that could just as well have been 
influenced by natural variation, she said. 
In the absence of a comprehensive plan to manage water 
quality in the basin, the regulatory agency tends to issue 
permits on a case by case basis, and determine that each 
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permit on its own would not cause a measurable degradation 
of the resource. But Watson asserted that all of the 
sources together could indeed cause a significant 
degradation of water quality. The nondegradation rules were 
passed to preserve high quality waters. But the DHES 
interpretation would have allowed incremental degradation to 
occur unchallenged, until established water quality 
standards were violated, at which time steps would be taken 
to prevent those violations. 
The Clark Fork Coalition and others espoused a policy 
of improvement in water quality conditions in the Clark Fork 
Basin. This policy was backed up by Montana Governor Ted 
Schwinden, who told Coalition members at their 1986 annual 
meeting that, "In the 1980's we have recognized the 
opportunity - indeed the responsibility - to bring the Clark 
Fork back to life as we approach our Centennial, we can 
feel proud that, in Montana's second century, the Clark Fork 
will gradually be restored to what a river should be - a 
source of life and of inspiration to those whose lives touch 
it." 
But the Coalition claimed that the DHES under the 
Schwinden Administration would allow pollutant loads to 
increase by not enforcing the nondegradation policy. "We 
can only wish that the Governor's strong commitment to 
improving the Clark Fork could be mirrored by the actions of 
the Dept. of Health and Environmental Sciences," the 
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Coalition's advisory committee wrote in its membership 
bulletin. 
Public awareness of the nondegradation issue heightened 
in the weeks before the April 17 hearing. The mill's 
application for its expanded pollution permit became the 
first significant test of Montana's 15 year old 
nondegradation policy. 
During a Technical Advisory Committee meeting to review 
the addendum, Vicki Watson, Peter Nielsen and Jim Carlson of 
the Missoula City/County Health Department challenged the 
mill's proposal, which they claimed would more than double 
the amount of solids, nitrogen and phosphorous discharged by 
the mill and allow disposal during the low flow and high 
temperature conditions of summer when aquatic life are most 
vulnerable to pollution. The Health Department's Jim 
Carlson said, "The nondegradation policy says that if the 
water is cleaner than what the state standards provide for, 
then that water shall remain relatively clean. That 
certainly doesn't mean you're allowed to pollute that water 
all the way up to the standard." 
But the Water Quality Bureau's Abe Horpestad claimed 
that a strict interpretation of the policy would be onerous, 
and have the effect of "throwing up a fence" around the 
state and preventing population and industrial growth. The 
mill's Larry Weeks concurred, "If you allow no increase from 
what it is now - no increase in discharge or 
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dischargers -that means you stop all development." 
Conservationists concerns about the nondegradation 
policy were being portrayed as a no-growth position, in an 
attempt to turn public opinion against an extreme viewpoint. 
Undaunted, the Coalition's committee of volunteers prepared 
an in-depth review of the policy and its implications for 
the pulp mill permit. They networked their information 
widely through member organizations and encouraged citizens 
to show up at the April 17 hearing to speak on behalf of the 
river, and the Citizens' Alternative. 
The nondegradat„LQ.n_policy became the clear focus of the 
Ajaril 17 hearing, as an estimated three to one majority of 
testifiers opposed the permit terms proposed by DHES. In an 
unusually unified and well informed display of public 
testimony, virtually all opponents addressed specific 
complaints toward the DHES' interpretation of 
nondegradation. The Clark Fork Coalition's representatives, 
including the author, Vicki Watson, Jim Curtis, Greg Munther 
and Tim Williamson of the Plains River Watchers group, 
claimed that proponents were misrepresenting its position as 
"no-growth" and "extremist". The purpose of the 
nondegradation policy is to limit waste discharges through 
better treatment and management, not to limit economic 
growth, the group said. Since the river and lake were 
valuable assets for tourism and recreation industries, and 
help attract new businesses to the region, the proposal to 
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allow more pollution was the no-growth policy, not the 
policy of nondegradation. 
No one speaking at the hearing suggested that the pulp 
mill be denied a five-year permit to discharge its wastes. 
It was the terms of that permit, and the effect of the 
nondegradation po 1 icy~~wHTcK"""wer:e at issue. 
Representatives of the Technical Advisory Committee 
complained that DHES had failed to respond to their requests 
for further information in the addendum on nutrient loads, 
solids, and color discharges from the mill. TAC member 
Vicki Watson claimed that most of the committee's 
recommendations for the addendum, with the exception of 
further studies, were ignored. "The addendum suggests to me 
that the Water Quality Bureau does not take the TAC very 
seriously with regard to decision making. I think they know 
a toothless tiger when they see it," she said. 
The Missoula City/County Health Department complained 
about the continued problem with rapid infiltration. "There 
is still no proposal in the short or long term to replace 
this treatment system with something equivalent," the 
Department said in prepared testimony. 
The Health Department, National Wildlife Federation and 
the Coalition all threatened to pursue due process remedies, 
including appeals and possible lawsuits, if the DHES did not 
change its interpretation of the nondegradation policy. 
DHES representatives wore a look of exhaustion and 
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exasperation following the beating they took at the hearing. 
Despite their best efforts to respond to criticism, despite 
considerable efforts to prepare the draft EIS and addendum, 
they had been raked over the coals once again. This time, 
however, there were serious and well researched legal 
threats on the winds of the public testimony. It was time 
for DHES to step back and take another look. A lengthy 
process of internal legal consultation was initiated, and 
DHES was not heard from publicly for several months. 
INACTION TESTS THE OPPOSITION'S PATIENCE 
During the weeks following the April hearing the 
Coalition kept up the pressure by contacting the EPA, which 
oversees the state's handling of discharge permits, and 
Governor Schwinden, who had made strong commitments to clean 
up the Clark Fork River. The EPA responded by pointing out 
serious problems with the state's interpretation of the 
nondegradation rules. "One area where the state and EPA 
appear to differ is in regard to the need for full 
intergovernmental coordination and public participation in 
establishing that allowing lower water quality is necessary 
to accommodate important economic or social development in 
the area in which the waters are located", wrote Montana 
Office Director John Wardell in a May 2 letter to Steve 
Pilcher. "Discussion of the Company's efforts to identify 
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and implement wastewater treatment alternatives to replace 
the failing rapid infiltration system is very brief and does 
not indicate much sincere effort by the Company to solve its 
problem," Wardell continued. 
Montana Governor Schwinden responded by calling a 
meeting with DHES staff, in which he reportedly made 
reference to the section of Montana's clean water statute 
which states that new or expanded dischargers must, "provide 
the degree of waste treatment necessary to maintain that 
existing high water quality" in streams whose quality exceed 
state standards. 
More time passed as DHES engaged in protracted internal 
review of the issue with their technical and legal staff. 
Conservationists grew impatient as another season of 
summertime discharge approached, and low snowpack conditions 
posed a potential threat to the river. The state's inaction 
was not a reflection of bureaucratic laziness or disregard 
for public concerns. On the contrary, as they got farther 
and farther into it, everyone began to realize that the case 
would establish some very important precedents. 
Nondegradation policies and their use were new territory for 
Montana, in fact only a handful of states in the country had 
seriously grappled with the problems that confronted DHES on 
this issue. Based on past experiences with the issue, DHES 
was very reluctant to jump and make a hasty decision that it 
would later regret. More time passed. 
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THE COALITION MOVES FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
Although the DHES" lengthy delay in reaching their 
decision frustrated conservationists at first, the extra 
time allowed tempers to cool and permitted those on all 
sides of the issue to reconsider their goals and objectives 
carefully. By mid-May, the Coalition's Board of Directors 
and advisory committee had reviewed the hearing testimony 
and statements made by mill officials at various meetings, 
and recognized significant opportunities for agreement on 
some of the most important points which had caused past 
disagreement. At this point, the Coalition took the unusual 
initiative to request meetings with DHES, the Governor's 
staff and Stone Container Corporation, who had purchased the 
Frenchtown mill in early 1986, to settle the entire matter. 
The Coalition's request was met with apparent 
skepticism at first. Due to the sensitive nature of the 
issue, and the previous threat of lawsuits, DHES was 
reluctant to engage in discussions with the parties until 
their own in-house review was complete and a legally 
defensible position was reached. The Coalition persisted in 
their requests, asking for the meetings in five separate 
written and telephone communications with DHES and Schwinden 
Administration officials. The conservation group insisted 
that the parties involved were no longer entrenched and 
their positions not that far apart. But DHES officials 
still seemed skeptical and suspicious of the group's 
motives. 
On May 20, Governor Schwinden wrote to the Coalition 
suggesting that the meetings proceed. But the DHES 
hesitated further as their closed door meetings continued to 
iron out internal differences of opinion. 
On June 3, the Coalition wrote to the Governor stating 
they were "surprised and disappointed that we have received 
no response to our request for such a meeting from DHES." 
It was, after all, quite rare for a conservation group to 
approach the agency with an offer to reach a settlement. 
The group expected a warm reception, but did not receive it. 
In a last ditch effort to move the agency off dead 
center, the group threatened legal action in a letter to 
Governor Schwinden. "We have contacted legal counsel, and 
are prepared to seek an injunction on the mill's summertime 
discharge if we do not reach an agreement before the end of 
this month. We have assembled a slate of technical experts 
whose testimony will support our case, and we are confident 
that the court will agree with us," the group wrote. 
On June 13, 1986 the Governor's office officially 
notified Stone Container, the Clark Fork Coalition and DHES 
that a meeting would take place on June 25 to discuss the 
terms of the pulp mill's discharge permit. Howard Johnson, 
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an aide to Governor Schwinden, wrote, "The decision 
regarding the permit will be made by the department of 
Health and Environmental Sciences, but I expect we can all 
agree on appropriate permit conditions." 
Governor Schwinden later wrote to the Coalition, 
stating, "I am urging all concerned parties to expedite 
their efforts to find a reasonable solution to this problem, 
consistent with the state's water quality regulations." 
THE TALKS BEGIN 
June 25 was a big day. The atmosphere was tense. No 
one was quite sure how things would turn out, or if they 
were doing the right thing by being there. Each party 
involved was assuming a huge risk by engaging in these 
discussions. 
The Coalition representatives, including the author, 
Kathy Hadley, Vicki Watson and attorney Jack Tohulske, had 
gone to great lengths to make the meeting happen. But in so 
doing, they had placed themselves in an uncomfortable 
position. Despite extensive efforts to consult with 
Coalition members before the meeting, there was no guarantee 
that any negotiated settlement reached that day would 
actually be supported by their constituents. Worse yet, the 
conservationists wondered if a negotiated settlement might 
be blasted by a vocal minority of concerned citizens, 
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setting the issue back into a hopeless confrontation once 
again. The Coalition was cast in the role of advocacy for 
the river. But at the same time the group was openly 
courting a settlement. Their duty was to represent the 
advocacy interests of their constituents. But they had made 
the decision to do so by deliberately seeking compromise. 
This apparent conflict in roles did not escape the 
conservationists. They had placed their own reputations on 
the line by entering the negotiations. 
The Department of Health and Environmental Sciences was 
also assuming considerable risks as it entered the meeting. 
The statutory responsibility and authority to make decisions 
regarding the discharge permit was the Department's. The 
staff took that responsibility seriously, and maintained 
that they could not participate actively in the 
negotiations. But they agreed to coordinate the meeting to 
help resolve disputes between the conservation groups and 
the industry. The DHES was represented by Deputy Director 
Bill Opitz, Steve Pilcher, Attorney Frank Crowley, and 
others. They seemed to have lingering doubts. What if the 
parties reached an agreement which was not wholly consistent 
with the laws and regulations the agency was charged to 
uphold? How would the public respond to their rejection of 
such an agreement? How would the public interpret their 
power in decision making if they did approve an agreement 
negotiated by other parties? DHES officials had placed 
129 
considerable faith in the negotiating parties. They had 
much to lose if the negotiations turned sour. 
And Stone Container assumed risks too. The outcome of 
the talks could have a profound influence on the mill, 
economically and politically. The individuals representing 
the Corporation, including mill manager Dan Potts, Larry 
Weeks, Curt Barton and attorney Russ Frye, were under great 
pressure to solve the problem. Their own reputations and 
their positions within the Company were at stake. Those 
pressures were increased markedly when the DHES' Bill Opitz 
opened the meeting by announcing the Department's revised 
interpretation of the nondegradation rules, and their 
intention to deny the mill's request for expanded discharge. 
Stone and the Coalition had actually been notified of 
the Department's decision before the meeting, through phone 
conversations with DHES attorney Frank Crowley. DHES had 
reviewed its interpretation of the nondegradation rules, in 
response to the comments of critics, and determined that a 
procedural issue concerning the division of labor between 
the Department and the Board of Health and Environmental 
Sciences was the key. DHES maintained that the Company was 
requesting increased discharge due to a failing treatment 
system, and was asking DHES to authorize their request in 
order to avoid expenditures on a replacement treatment 
system. DHES now agreed with its critics, that such 
decisions to balance additional waste discharge against the 
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costs of treatment belonged with the Board, the quasi-
judicial branch of the government, and not with the 
Department, the administrative branch. DHES would therefore 
deny the company's request, issue a permit reflecting the 
terms of the 1982 permit, and notify the company of their 
right to file a petition for amendments to the Board within 
30 days, under the procedure outlined in the nondegradation 
rules. 
The DHES decision immediately put Stone into the role 
of appellant, and declared victory for the Coalition. The 
conservation group might have been satisfied with the 
decision, and withdrawn their request for negotiations. But 
they did not. The group was concerned that they might well 
win the battle, but leave themselves open to losing the war 
at a later date through company appeals or even revisions of 
the nondegradation policy in the legislature. Once again, 
the Coalition was placed in the unusual position where they 
had the duty to zealously represent the immediate interests 
of their constituents, but an obligation to settle the issue 
in a manner which could protect their long-term interests. 
The negotiations proceeded. The "nondegradation 
permit" reflecting original, 1982 terms was set aside, and 
the parties resolved to find permit terms they could all 
agree with. If this could be accomplished, the company 
could present terms to the Board in its amendment petition 
which would receive the support of conservationists. As 
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long as the Board would concur, the parties would all enjoy 
a much more predictable resolution to the conflict than 
might be achieved through confrontational proceedings before 
the Board, or litigation. 
There was no "cookbook" for conflict mediation 
available to the Coalition representatives, no instructions 
on how to proceed. One of the conservationists was trained 
as an attorney. Lawyers are trained to settle cases in a 
court of law, based on a vigorous representation of their 
clients and browbeating. Intimidation plays a great role in 
discussions between lawyers — conciliation and mediation is 
difficult under these circumstances. Stone Corporation and 
its attorney possessed great experience in such conflicts, 
as much of our modern mediation theory has been developed in 
labor law. The conservationists were at an immediate 
disadvantage in terms of negotiating experience. 
To further confuse the discussions, the role of 
mediator was not clearly established. DHES staff and its 
attorney seemed to be prepared to assume the role, but did 
not assert themselves as such. The Department was clearly 
more comfortable in the role of observer. Early in the 
talks, Stone and its attorney seized the floor to present a 
lengthy series of arguments. They behaved as if they were 
in a court of law, rather than a negotiating session, as 
they brought forth technical experts armed with data, legal 
arguments and flip charts to make their best case. 
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The Coalition was reluctant to engage in these tactics 
and, following token responses to company statements, 
established the first move toward mediation. The Coalition 
insisted that further talks focus on the limited issues on 
which agreement was possible, while setting aside, for the 
time being, disagreements over non-essential technical and 
legal issues. Acting as spokesman for the Coalition, the 
author stated, "Over the past two years, and especially the 
past six months, we've all spent considerable effort 
analyzing this issue, reviewing the data and discussing 
various alternatives. It seems that we have all come to a 
more thorough understanding of the situation than we had in 
1984 - and that includes a more complete understanding of 
each other's position on the issue, and what needs to be 
done to satisfy all of our concerns. I also believe we have 
come to a point where we can reach substantial agreement on 
what needs to be done to resolve the issue at hand - and 
that is the pulp mill's discharge permit. That doesn't mean 
that we can agree now, or ever, on all of the technical 
issues, interpretations of data and so forth. We probably 
shouldn't expect to ever completely achieve this - maybe we 
just have to agree to disagree on certain things, put them 
aside, clear out our minds and find some common ground on 
the issue at hand." 
Stone then presented an offer to contribute an 
unspecified, but substantial amount of cash for further 
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river studies in exchange for an agreement on relaxed permit 
conditions. The Coalition quickly rejected this notion, and 
reiterated its suggestion to talk permit terms. 
At this point in the talks the parties agreed to focus 
on five permit limitations of concern, 1) TSS, 2) BOD, 3) 
flow and temperature discharge cutoff thresholds, 4) color 
standard compliance monitoring, and, 5) nutrients. The 
Department circulated a draft permit for the purposes of 
discussion, including suggested compromise conditions. 
Stone and the Coalition reviewed the proposals, and 
countered with their own proposals for each limitation 
category. All three proposals were then recorded on 
chalkboards for all to see. Discussions proceeded to 
address each subject, one by one, until a settlement or 
partial agreement was reached for allowable discharges of 
TSS and BOD, and seasonal river flow and temperature cutoff 
thresholds for direct discharge. Stone proposed a change in 
compliance procedures for the color standard, allowing 
calculation of color change based on discharge rate and 
effluent color content, to replace the inconsistent means of 
measuring instream color during spring runoff periods. The 
Coalition representatives endorsed their request, 
conditional on Water Quality Bureau approval of the change 
and maintenance of the color standard itself. 
The issue of nutrient loading was also left partially 
unresolved, with a general agreement for DHES to prepare a 
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draft of nutrient permit language for review, based on the 
ideas espoused by Stone and the Coalition. There was 
substantive agreement to minimize the application of 
nutrients to the treatment system (nutrients were added to 
promote waste treatment in a biological process) by 1988, 
and to conduct engineering studies to assess alternatives 
means of reducing nutrients further. The parties agreed to 
engage in further talks, if necessary, to address the DHES1 
draft permit language on nutrients. 
All of the major topics of disagreement had been 
addressed. An atmosphere of optimism filled the room as the 
Coalition and DHES staff felt that a substantial agreement 
had been reached, and that remaining details would be minor 
and easily resolved. But that optimism was shattered as, in 
the closing moments of the meeting, Stone representatives 
renewed their challenge of the entire process and cast 
serious doubts on what had been accomplished through 
negotiations. 
A few days following the meeting, the Coalition wrote 
to Stone, expressing great disappointment over the apparent 
impasse on the subject of process, following a very 
productive day of discussing permit terms. "It seems 
that we could chart a course which will result in a 
reasonable, non-confrontational solution to the issue," the 
group wrote. The Coalition sensed a deep distrust of 
conservationist motives for the settlement, "...perhaps (you 
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are) worried that somehow we will change our minds along the 
way, or that we will use this example as an opportunity to 
take some underhanded digs at Stone or the Water Quality 
Bureau," the Coalition suggested. The group assured Stone, 
in writing, that they would not pressure the Board of Health 
for further restrictions beyond those agreed to at the 
meeting, and the permit language left to be resolved 
pertaining to nutrients, as long as Stone would go along 
with the process as presented by DHES. And the Coalition 
assured Stone that they would not go out of their way to 
make anyone look bad when the issue was over, that they 
would in fact be happy to see the Water Quality Bureau and 
mill come out with a positive public image. "(We) hope that 
Stone will see fit to continue to participate in the 
cooperative atmosphere established at our meeting, and to 
seek an acceptable solution to this issue," the Coalition 
stated. 
The Coalition had, in effect, gone out of their way to 
assure Stone that they would not double cross them, or hurt 
their public image following a settlement. The group was 
interested in preserving relationships of trust and respect 
that had been established over a long period of time. They 
would not burn their bridges when it was all over. 
Stone, apparently, became convinced that DHES would not 
concede to its arguments over the process, and that the 
Coalition could be trusted. Stone continued to participate 
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in discussions to settle the permit issue. 
On July 3, DHES mailed another draft compromise permit 
to Stone and the Coalition for their review. With 
relatively minor exceptions, Stone expressed agreement with 
the compromise conditions. But the Coalition was still 
unhappy with the language pertaining to nutrients. Despite 
efforts to agree on the issue at the June 25 meeting, 
specific permit language was not drafted by the negotiating 
parties. As a result, the DHES was left in the middle to 
make a judgement based on the ideas expressed by both 
parties. Stone found the language acceptable, the Coalition 
did not. The issue of nutrient loading, which was of 
primary concern to downstream residents along the river and 
Lake Pend Oreille, remained unresolved. It was the only 
major stumbling block to the completion of an agreement, and 
as is often the case, the last point was one of the most 
difficult issues to deal with. 
Further talks were agreed to by Stone Container's Dan 
Potts, and the Coalition's Board of Directors. This time 
they would be conducted without the DHES, and would be held 
at the Frenchtown mill on July 18. Dan Potts, Larry Weeks, 
Jack Tohulske and the author met for over three hours, 
addressing only the issue of nutrients for the compromise 
conditions. Following numerous drafts and re-drafts of 
permit language, Stone Container and the Coalition agreed on 
a one page statement on nutrients, stipulating a goal to 
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return total nutrient loading to the river to levels 
approximate to those discharged before 1983 , by no later 
than 1991. If the goal was not reached, the mill would have 
to go back to the Board of Health to appeal the nutrient 
condition before issuance of a new permit. The statement 
was attached to a joint letter signed by the two parties and 
mailed to the Water Quality Bureau, requesting it be 
considered for inclusion in the compromise conditions. 
The last remaining hurdle had been crossed. All that 
was left was to secure approval from the state, from the 
Board of Directors of both parties, and significantly, from 
the public. 
Before the permit negotiations had been finalized, the 
Coalition had scheduled a public meeting to be held in 
Sandpoint, Idaho on July 23. Sincere efforts had been made 
by all parties to not leak information to the news media or 
others concerning the negotiations until they were final. 
But the upcoming meeting in Sandpoint, whose citizens had 
provided some of the most stern opposition to the pulp mill 
discharge in the past, would make it quite difficult to keep 
the story quiet. The Coalition's Board of Directors was 
anxious to present the terms of the agreement to its rank 
and file. The Sandpoint audience would provide a good 
litmus test of public sentiment. But the agreement would 
not be final until the Water Quality Bureau had reviewed and 
accepted its terms. The Coalition urged the Bureau to make 
138 
their announcement prior to the July 23 meeting. The 
pressure was on, and the public meeting was driving the 
process. 
The Department of Health and Environmental Sciences 
issued a news release on July 23, announcing their decision 
to deny the mill's expanded permit, and to cooperate in 
discussions for a compromise agreement to be presented to 
the Board of Health for final approval. DHES announced that 
citizen comments raised during the addendum review process 
had, "....for the first time, squarely raised the issue of 
the respective roles of the DHES and the State Board of 
Health and Environmental Sciences (BOH) under the 
nondegradation section of the Montana Water Quality Act." 
The agency said they would release a Final EIS recommending 
that the company's request for a long-term extension of 
relaxed permit conditions be denied, and that a public 
hearing would be held on this decision on August 28. The 
news release went on to point out that Stone would have the 
option of appealing the decision under the procedures 
outlined in the nondegradation rules. "In anticipation of 
such an appeal, representatives of the environmental 
community, Stone, the Governor's Clark Fork Coordination 
Project and DHES have initiated discussions intended to 
allow the company to seek revised permit conditions that 
would have a broad base of support before the Board," DHES 
said. The Department stopped short of announcing the terms 
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negotiated by Stone and the Coalition. 
But the Coalition discussed those terms in complete 
detail during that evening's meeting in Sandpoint. Peter 
Nielsen and Dr. Vicki Watson of the University of Montana 
described the entire course of events from the release of 
the draft EIS through the negotiations with Stone. They 
pointed out that the Water Quality Bureau had made the 
difficult admission that it lacked the authority to make the 
decision it had proposed as early as 1983. The Water 
Quality Bureau had to admit that it was wrong, and that is 
hard for anyone to do, the group said. Proposed permit 
conditions negotiated with Stone were described, and 
presented to the audience in a handout comparing them to 
both the 1982 and 1984 permits, so everyone would be 
absolutely clear on what had been accomplished. The 
spokespersons stated their belief that the compromise permit 
conditions actually would be better, in some ways, than a 
straight rollback to 1982 conditions - principally because 
of the new condition pertaining to nutrients. 
The Coalition's representatives then took a deep 
breath, and waited to hear the reaction. Things seemed to 
be going pretty well during the meeting. The Coalition was 
confident they could defend the agreement on a technical 
basis. But there was no guaranty. 
The audience responded with praise. Mike Beckwith, 
senior environmental specialist for the Idaho Division of 
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Environment congratulated the Coalition for doing " a 
fabulous job" in working out the compromise. Others in the 
audience enthusiastically agreed, as a lively and upbeat 
discussion of the apparent victory shifted into other areas 
of pollution concerns. "If we have no one else to blame, we 
will have to look to ourselves and our unsewered areas," 
Beckwith told the audience as discussions carried on 
concerning the need for better local pollution controls and 
more ambitious government studies to document pollution 
problems. 
The positive reaction of Sandpoint citizens was 
encouraging for the Coalition. Although many hurdles 
remained to be crossed before the Board of Health could 
review the compromise agreement, no earlier than November, 
momentum had been established. The prospects for settlement 
were bright. 
The next item of business was the release of the 
state's Final EIS and tentative "nondegradation" permit. 
This would be followed by the August 28 public hearing. 
Fifteen days after the hearing, DHES would issue the 
nondegradation permit reflecting 1982 discharge conditions. 
Stone then would have 30 days to appeal the terms of that 
permit, in a petition for amendments to the Board of Health. 
The Board would review the petition in September, to assure 
completeness and determine whether further environmental 
review was necessary. A public hearing would be held in 
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November, if all went as planned, followed by a final Board 
decision. 
The August public hearing went well, as conservation 
groups supported the state's revised stance on 
nondegradation, and speakers from both sides applauded 
efforts to negotiate a settlement. The hearing served as a 
means to inform citizens about the issues and the terms of 
the proposed settlement. The Stone/Coalition agreement was 
portrayed by many speakers, including David Owen of the 
Missoula Chamber of Commerce, as a "win - win" situation for 
both sides, with both the mill and river advocates gaining 
something through the proposition. Some speakers, including 
Mike Micone of the Western Environmental Trade Association, 
expressed feelings of sour grapes, claiming that the mill 
had been treated unfairly and subjected to extreme scrutiny 
by the DHES and environmentalists. 
DHES issued the nondegradation permit. 
On September 10, 1986 Stone Container and the Clark 
Fork Coalition sent a letter signed by the author and mill 
manager Dan Potts to the Water Quality Bureau, making 
several minor modifications to the compromise permit 
conditions, and closing the book on these negotiations. 
"With the above changes, the Clark Fork Coalition and Stone 
Container have reached final agreement on the proposed 
Compromise Conditions for Stone's discharge permit," the 
letter stated. 
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The stage was set for Stone to appeal the 
nondegradation permit, requesting the amendments negotiated 
with the Coalition. They had thirty days to do it, but the 
next Board of Health meeting was September 26. Despite the 
existence of administrative rules specifying petition 
requirements since 1982, Stone's nondegradation petition 
would be Montana's first. The requirements set forth in the 
rules were detailed and comprehensive. Stone had no 
examples to use in preparation of their petition. Their 
first draft would be nearly 100 pages in length. 
As the company proceeded to prepare the petition, both 
sides agreed that there could be ample room for disagreement 
over the arguments presented, and the data used to back up 
their claims for permit amendments. The petition would be 
an important instrument for both parties, explaining the 
rationale behind the permit changes to the Board of Health 
and the public. Neither party wanted the petition's content 
to disrupt the agreement. But the Coalition stated, at the 
August hearing, that it would withdraw its support for the 
compromise if Stone submitted a faulty or incomplete 
petition. This was, after all, the first nondegradation 
petition ever submitted in Montana. The conservation group 
did not want the mill to be relieved of its duty to file an 
appropriate petition to the Board, just because it had 
struck an agreement with its opposition. Stone viewed the 
Coalition's unqualified support as crucial in order to 
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receive approval from the Board of Health. With a fast 
approaching deadline of September 26, the parties agreed to 
further talks. 
Stone provided a draft petition to the Coalition for 
review. To the conservation group's amazement, the company 
had included a nine page section in the document, drafted by 
their attorney, challenging the entire process. At the same 
time the group was notified that/ Stone's attorney had filed 
motion for rehearing to the Department of Health and 
Environmental Sciences. These moves angered the 
conservation group at a particularly sensitive point in the 
process. Although the group understood Stone's intent to 
preserve their options should the deal fall through, 
relations between the parties were damaged and the Coalition 
wondered if they could ever fully trust the company. 
The Coalition retained the services of their own 
attorney, Jack Tohulske, and combed the petition for flaws. 
They requested a meeting with Stone to review the petition, 
and when it occurred, Tohulske and the author presented a 
series of complaints concerning the content of the document. 
While the initial talks were handled by focusing on the 
permit conditions alone, these discussions were forced into 
areas of deep disagreement between the parties. Number one 
on the Coalition's list of complaints was the section 
challenging the entire process and requesting that the Board 
dismiss the case. If that section was not removed in its 
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entirety, and numerous other statements not removed or 
tempered substantially, the group said it would withdraw its 
support of the petition. The entire agreement was more 
vulnerable than it had been at any time since June 25. The 
ball was in Stone's court. Would they respond? 
A few days later the Coalition received another draft 
petition. This time, the section challenging the process 
was gone, and most of the disputed statements had been 
revised or removed. Tohulske and several members of the 
Coalition's advisory committee reviewed the document 
carefully, and found that they could not agree with 
everything it stated, but that Stone had made a sincere 
effort to eliminate inaccuracies and to moderate statements 
disputed by the conservation group. A major confrontation 
had been averted. 
On September 26, Stone presented its petition for 
amendments to the Montana Board of Health and Environmental 
Sciences. The Coalition and the Department endorsed it as 
complete under the requirements of the nondegradation rules. 
The Board scheduled a public hearing on the petition for 
November 14, 1986. 
THE PULP MILL GETS A PERMIT 
Stone Container and the Coalition went into the 
November 14 public hearing in support of the same proposal. 
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The two parties had even engaged in last minute 
negotiations, on the eve of the public hearing, to draft a 
proposed "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final 
Order" to submit for Board approval, should the petition for 
amendment be approved. In contrast to all previous hearings 
on this controversial issue, only a handful of individuals 
and groups made the trip to Helena to testify before the 
Board. The Board listened in astonishment as speaker after 
speaker came forth to support the petition for permit 
changes. 
Stone Container told the board, "It's been a very, very 
long road for us. We believe the modified permit will be 
beneficial to the company and to the Clark Fork River." 
The Coalition was represented at the hearing by Peter 
Nielsen, Vicki Watson, and Jack Tohulske. In pre-filed 
testimony filed with the Board, the Coalition stated, "The 
requested amendments will allow economic development, while 
providing new permit conditions which will result in a 
permit which is, on balance, as good as or better than the 
old permit. This is a balancing of public interests." 
Vicki Watson agreed that the proposed permit was technically 
sound and superior to the original permit. She also 
endorsed the case as Montana's first application of its 
nondegradation rules. Tohulske stated that Board approval 
of the proposed permit amendments would demonstrate that the 
nondegradation policy can work, and it can provide a layer 
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of protection for aquatic resources. 
"Nondegradation could no longer be portrayed as a "no-
growth" policy, but rather as a "pro-growth" policy due to 
its ability to protect the interests of the pulp mill and 
the river, which are both valuable economic resources for 
the region," the group said. 
The petition also received support from an unusual 
alliance of groups and agencies, ranging from the Sierra 
Club, to the League of Women Voters, to the Idaho and 
Montana Fish and Game Departments, to the Missoula Health 
Department, to the Montana Wood Products Association and 
Western Environmental Trade Association. No one spoke in 
opposition. 
When the testimony was complete, one Board member said, 
"Is that it? There's really no opposition?" Attorney 
Howard Toole, a board member from Missoula, began to ask 
some tough questions on procedural issues, which ignited a 
brief display of posturing and browbeating by the attorneys 
from Stone, the Coalition and DHES. But Board member Ed 
Zaidlecz, of Billings, seemed to recognize the significance 
of efforts to reconcile disputes on the most relevant 
issues, while casting aside differences in opinion over 
technical or procedural issues. "Let's hurry up and approve 
this thing before somebody changes their mind," he said. 
After commending DHES attorney Frank Crowley for his 
considerable efforts to bring the compromise package 
together, the board voted unanimously to approve Stone's 
petition for amendment. 
On December 5r 1986 the Department of Health and 
Environmental Sciences modified the Frenchtown pulp mill's 
wastewater discharge permit in accordance with the Board's 
decision. 
******** 
In 1987, thirteen years following state approval of the 
expansion permit, Stone Container proposed to install a $3 
million color removal treatment system at the Frenchtown 
pulp mill. The system would allow the mill to replace 
treatment capabilities lost when the rapid infiltration 
system failed, and to increase its flexibility in bleach 
pulp production. The mill presented its proposal up front 
to the DHES and the Clark Fork Coalition, and worked closely 
with potential critics to resolve their concerns. The mill 
conducted a bioassay study of effluent treated in a pilot 
plant to assess potential toxicity. When the CFC disagreed 
with some of this study's conclusions, the mill scheduled a 
meeting to attempt to resolve the group's concerns. An 
agreement was reached between Stone, the Coalition and DHES 
to approve the new system, but to impose certain 
restrictions on allowable discharge dilution ratios and 
monitoring requirements. The matter was handled 
efficiently, and responsibly. The new treatment system was 
installed in the fall of 1987. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Frenchtown pulp mill opened on the banks of the 
Clark Fork River in 1957 without the benefit of thorough 
environmental review, planning or public participation in 
decisions affecting the quality of the river's aquatic 
resources. Fish kills and other serious impacts to aquatic 
life caused considerable uproar during the mill's first 
years. An atmosphere of confrontation and mistrust led to a 
form of decision-making by crisis. In reaction to public 
outcry, the mill installed its first waste treatment system 
in 1958, and the state finally assumed its regulatory 
functions in 1962. The company's inability to live up to 
the promises and pledges of its boosters, for both water and 
air pollution control, got the pulp mill off on the wrong 
foot in western Montana. The events of this period caused a 
lasting bitterness among conservationists and many area 
residents. 
During the decade of the 1970's a host of new 
environmental laws and regulations were passed, and applied 
to an old plant with a history of problems. Environmental 
advocates were zealous in their use of new found power under 
these government procedures. Industry backers railed 
against conservation interests, characterizing them as 
obstructionists and extremists. Undaunted, the 
environmentalists attempted to use every possible legal and 
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procedural device to create delays or impose new 
restrictions before allowing the proposed expansion. State 
agencies, on the other hand, seemed resistant to change. 
They weren't used to the newly proscribed role of the public 
in decision-making, and seemed to view citizen input as a 
threat to their power and authority. As a result, many 
decisions were poorly handled, and relations with 
conservationists were further polarized. The mill was 
permitted to expand despite a majority of public comments 
asking for a temporary delay. Additional wastewater 
disposal needs would be handled, in part, by an experimental 
disposal system. If it failed, the state pledged, an 
alternative means of treatment would be required. Despite a 
protracted battle over the issue of the delay, the mill made 
their own decision to postpone the expansion for two years. 
In 1983 the mill asked for permission to increase its 
direct discharge to the river instead of replacing the 
experimental disposal system, which had failed. The 
regulatory agency seemed to forget the pledges made, almost 
ten years earlier, to require a replacement system. The 
agency mis-gauged changing public values toward the river 
and the lake into which it flowed. When the state proposed 
to allow the mill's increased discharge, an explosive 
confrontation resulted as a broad range of public interests 
united to fight the decision. 
This case study illustrates what can occur when poor 
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planning is coupled with changing societal values and a 
decision-making process which is better equipped to 
perpetuate conflicts than to resolve them. 
Inadequate planning for water quality protection and 
wastewater treatment dates back to the early 1950'sf when 
the Clark Fork River below Missoula was first considered as 
a pulp mill site. As the mill expanded, water quality 
resource planning was always a step behind the development. 
When the mill conducted its largest expansion ever, in the 
1970's, an experimental disposal system was approved, but 
there was no serious effort to plan for the contingency that 
the system might fail. 
During the mill's first two decades of operations the 
Clark Fork River was not a highly valued public resource. 
Its waters were used as a cheap and convenient means to rid 
society of its wastes. Mining and smelting industries in 
the headwaters had, for nearly a century, been more intent 
on disemboweling the earth of its mineral riches than 
protecting the quality of downstream, aquatic resources. 
Garbage was heaped on the river's banks and swept away with 
each spring's snowmelt. Junk auto bodies were strewn along 
riverbanks to protect against floods. Raw sewage was dumped 
into the river by every community along its length. The 
river carried the burden of our refuse and our disregard, 
and little else. Even the buildings on Missoula's Front 
Street faced the other way. 
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But new laws and rules were passed in the 1960's and 
1970's to protect and improve water quality. Sewage plants 
were built, better treatment systems were required at the 
copper mines and the pulp mill. Garbage dumps were cleaned 
up. 
The river responded, cleansing itself of much of its 
past disregard. People began to make more use of the river, 
take more pride in it. Recreational access sites and 
riverfront parks sprang up. Suddenly it became a focal 
point for our communities - a front yard, no longer a back 
alley. 
When the mill and the state water pollution control 
agency proposed to allow more waste discharge into the Clark 
Fork River, people were concerned that we were beginning to 
lose ground again, that we were turning back the hands of 
time on the outstanding progress made toward reclaiming the 
river. The proposal spurred a public outcry of massive 
proportions. Citizens and groups representing diverse 
interests came forth to speak on behalf of the river and the 
lake. It wasn't just the same old group of environmental 
enthusiasts any more - there were property owners, business 
groups, environmentalists, sportsmen, and a lot of old 
timers who remembered the Clark Fork that was. 
The issue became as controversial and confrontational 
as any conservation problem ever witnessed in western 
Montana. Opposing factions were deeply divided, and rarely 
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communicated with each other outside of the media and 
officially sanctioned public hearings. Some hearings became 
grandstanding events, as the participants engaged in name 
calling, and shouting matches, only serving to perpetuate 
the conflict. 
The case study clearly demonstrates basic flaws in the 
way we go about making controversial natural resource 
decisions. Environmental issues are among the most 
confrontational matters dealt with by government. 
Conservation groups and industry backers tend to stand off 
in their respective camps and take their best shots at each 
other while leaving the decision making authority in the 
hands of the government. Michael Sandell, a political 
theorist from Harvard, refers to our decision structure as 
the "procedural republic and the unencumbered self." We 
have a complex set of procedural rules to guide the 
responsible agency in these issues. This is the procedural 
republic. The procedures are designed to guarantee everyone 
the right to public notice and the right to be heard on 
matters which affect their basic rights. But the only party 
who is burdened to hear citizen comments is the responsible 
agency. Public hearings are designed to allow everyone an 
opportunity to speak their mind. But the testifiers at 
these hearings are not encumbered with the responsibility to 
make decisions. This is the unencumbered self. There are 
no rules governing accuracy or fairness in public testimony. 
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No rules allowing a disagreeing party to respond. No 
requirements that opposing parties speak to each other, or 
hear each other. The only party who must listen is the 
hearing officer, representing the responsible agency which 
is stuck in the middle, trying to make sense out of what 
they hear and to make a decision in the best public 
interest. This decision, if it involves a compromise, has 
the unique quality of never actually being advocated by any 
of the contestants. This is a cumbersome and inefficient 
way of doing government business on natural resource issues. 
Opposing factions spend considerable effort and funds 
fighting each other and making their best case to the 
agency. If they don't agree with the decision, they can 
appeal it, or go to court, costing more time and money. The 
opponents then may go through the motions again in court, 
before the judge decides in favor of one of the contestants, 
or a settlement is reached. 
The most recent episode of controversy at the 
Frenchtown pulp mill started out this way. Public hearings 
were held in early 1986, and both factions organized a 
sequence of expert witnesses to make their best case before 
the Department of Health and Environmental Sciences. The 
Department was placed in the difficult position of 
interpreting all of the evidence and making a decision 
consistent with the laws and regulations it was charged to 
uphold, and reflecting the best public interest. The 
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opposing parties rarely agreed with the DHES' decisions. 
But in this case, the opponents made a sincere effort 
to communicate with each other, beginning with the 1984 
settlement reached between conservation groups and the 
company. The framework of advisory committees, public 
forums and meetings initiated by this agreement allowed 
opponents to break down some of the barriers prevalent in 
most natural resource issues. A dialogue was established, 
and after a long period of time, the parties developed a 
relationship of guarded trust and respect. Stone Container 
and the Clark Fork Coalition began to challenge the premises 
of the procedural republic. The parties took a more serious 
responsibility to communicate with each other and resolve 
conflicts. 
This course of events may have been interpreted as a 
deep threat to the bureaucracy, a surrender of power and 
authority to citizens and private interests. But in this 
case the Department of Health and Environmental Sciences was 
willing to go to the extra trouble, assume the additional 
risks, and not only allow, but carefully assist the opposing 
parties as they attempted to resolve their differences. 
Although the Department firmly stated that it would not 
surrender its authority or responsibility to make the final 
decision on this issue, and that it would not participate 
directly in negotiations, it cooperated. As Steve Pilcher 
said, reflecting on the case a year after the Board of 
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Health issued its final decision, "There comes a time when 
you have to put pride and the past behind you, and be 
willing to sit down and discuss the issues openly with your 
critics." 
The 1986 resolution of the wastewater permit issue for 
the Frenchtown pulp mill was viewed as a huge success by all 
participants. Both the company and river advocates said 
they were not only pleased with the result, but that they 
had gained more than they had lost. Endless appeals of 
agency decisions, and lawsuits were avoided. Government 
costs were reduced. Relationships were established which 
both parties agreed would allow a more efficient discussion 
of future water quality issues. Both the industry and the 
conservation group expressed hopes that the positive 
relationships would continue, and that other groups and 
industries would note the advantages of the approach they 
had taken. 
If other groups and industries wish to employ the 
techniques of conflict resolution on natural resource 
issues, they must carefully examine what it takes to get to 
the point where it is possible, and what must be done to 
avoid the pitfalls. This case study provides some real 
world examples which help answer those questions. 
First comes the question of what is necessary to get 
there. In this case study, it was revealed that both sides 
first engaged in lengthy confrontations within the 
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traditional decision-making procedures of government before 
serious talks were initiated to resolve the conflict. One 
school of thought maintains that this exercise, which in 
this case lasted for nearly three years, is unavoidable, 
perhaps necessary. As Board of Health member Howard Toole 
points out, the public hearing process allows each side to 
have at each other, vent their emotions, and engage in 
serious reality testing. Each side of the issue has the 
opportunity, though no obligation, to better understand each 
other's perspective, compare viewpoints, and revise their 
own positions. "Without the cathartic public hearing 
process, any negotiations may be stillborn," Toole says. 
What's important, he adds, is that the parties engage in 
such a manner that relationships are not damaged, bridges 
are not burned. If this is not done, conflicts may become 
so deeply seated that the parties are simply unable to talk 
to one another when the time for negotiations arrives. 
Missoula City Councilman Dan Kemmis agrees, "Let's 
admit we're never going to reach Nirvana. We're going to 
fight, the question is how do we conduct our fight. We 
should keep in mind, when fighting these natural resource 
battles, that today's fight is not the last chapter - we may 
see each other tomorrow," Kemmis said. 
But Kemmis does not agree that confrontations need to 
proceed for the length of time presented in this case study. 
"Consensus works," Kemmis says, "whenever both sides attain 
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a roughly even balance of power." 
This case study shows the value of preserving, and 
developing positive relationships with the opposition at the 
same time that confrontational battles are being waged. If 
the Clark Fork Coalition, Stone, and the Water Quality 
Bureau had not been so careful to avoid damaging public 
statements, to build trust and respect, and to understand 
each other's position, the consensus process may have never 
occurred. In the end, the parties were able to sit down and 
talk. But serious efforts to resolve the issue to 
everyone's satisfaction would not have occurred had the 
opposing parties not attained a roughly even balance of 
power. From the perspective of a conservationist involved 
in the process, this even balance of power was not attained 
until the Department reversed their decision, and 
recommended a denial of the mill's request. If this had not 
occurred, it is doubtful if the mill would have had enough 
incentive to settle the issue in the.manner which they did. 
The Department's decision was the club the Coalition needed 
to gain speedy concessions on important issues, and to 
arrive at a settlement that would be supported by its 
constituents. 
It is also worthwhile to consider some problems with 
the consensus process, as applied in this case study. All 
parties who engaged in the talks assumed significant 
personal and organizational risks. The process must somehow 
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become widely accepted or institutionalized to avoid these 
risks, or its use will be severely limited. Additionally, 
the participants, particularly those from the Coalition, 
were forced to assume a dual role. They had the duty to 
zealously represent the immediate interests of their 
constituents, but at the same time to seek a compromise 
which would represent their long-term interests. The agency 
faced the risk of a loss of bureaucratic power through the 
process, and was reluctant to assume an official role of 
mediator. The Coalition assumed this role, to an extent, 
but it was an uncomfortable position, and one not likely to 
be consistently repeated by other groups in similar 
situations. If we wish to encourage the consensus process, 
we must find a way to provide neutral mediators. This 
raises the issue of who should pay for the mediator's 
services. At this time, civil penalties for violations of 
state environmental standards and discharge permits go to 
the state general fund. A more appropriate use, and one 
which would benefit the resource , would be to establish a 
mediation fund with a portion of these penalties. 
Its also worth noting that conservation groups have an 
undeniable stake in conflict. Controversial issues build 
memberships, and raise money. The Coalition assumed a risk 
of losing memberships by engaging in negotiations with 
Stone, not only because some people would undoubtably be 
unhappy with the result, but because they were doing away 
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with their hottest issue - the one that got them started in 
the first place. How can we provide conservation groups 
with adequate funding to perform the necessary level of 
technical analysis on such issues, and to engage in 
consensus building processes to resolve the issues, if they 
will lose members and financial support in the process? Can 
we really expect groups to maintain the level of involvement 
displayed in this case study over a long period of time? 
It is possible. But groups will have to make broad 
changes in the way they operate and the way they present 
themselves to the public. The constituency of conservation 
groups has been committed to fighting the battles for clean 
air and clean water for many years. The groups are tied to 
their constituencies, and to the battles that help attract 
members and financial support. But groups should not be 
deterred by the fear of losing members and financial 
suppport. There certainly is a constituency for 
conservation groups which is interested in the type of 
public involvement displayed in this case study — a 
constituency which is attracted to resolving controversies, 
not just the controversies themselves. The challenge, then, 
for conservation groups and all others who have a stake in 
this form of public conduct is to foster this shift in 
public behavior, and to challenge the procedural republic. 
The shift could involve big changes in the way we make 
public decisions on natural resource issues. 
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Appendix A: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
1951 
U.S. Public Health Service publishes first report on 
pulp mill sites in Montana. 
1955 
U.S. Public Health Service publishes second report on 
pulp mill sites, including the Clark Fork River below 
Missoula. 
1956 
U.S. Congress enacts Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act 
1957 
Waldorf Paper Company opens Frenchtown pulp mill, with 













First fish kill occurs in the Clark Fork River in 
August. Mill's first settling ponds constructed 
following fish kill, providing waste storage. 
First Expansion of production at Frenchtown mill, from 
250 TPD to 450 TPD. 
Second fish kill occurs in Clark Fork River in 
September. 
Montana Board of Health negotiates first discharge 
conditions with pulp mill prior to a spring discharge 
season. 
U.S. Congress enacts the Water Quality Act. 
Waldorf Paper Products merges with Hoerner Boxes to 
form Hoerner-Waldorf Corporation. 
Montana Legislature enacts the Montana Water Quality 
Act. 
Montana Department of Health and Environmental Sciences 
issues first Wastewater Discharge Permit to the 
Frenchtown Mill. 
U.S. Congress enacts National Environmental Policy Act. 
Frenchtown mill adds primary clarifier to wastewater 
treatment system. 
Montana Legislature enacts Montana Environmental Policy 
Act, and amends Water Quality Act to include a 
nondegradation policy. 
Board of Health establishes compliance schedule for 
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Frenchtown mill to install secondary aeration treatment 
system (Best Practicable Control Technology). 
U.S. Congress enacts Water Pollution Control Act, 












Montana legislature amends Water Pollution Control Act 
to broaden enforcement capabilities and allow state to 
implement MPDES permit system. 
Hoerner-Waldorf announces two-phase expansion proposal 
to increase production from 1,150 TPD to 1,850 TPD. 
Mill experiments with rapid infiltration disposal 
system. 
DHES grants permit variance due to low river flows, 
allowing increased discharges from the mill. 
Concerned Citizens for a Quality Environment forms. 
EPA holds public hearing on first NPDES permit 
DHES prepares EIS on proposed expansion, holds public 
hearings. 
State assumes MPDES permit authority from the EPA. 
DHES grants expansion permit. 
Mill installs secondary treatment, aeration basins. 
Phase I expansion begins at mill. 120 acres of rapid 
infiltration basins handling 63% of wastewater 
disposal. 
Champion International Corporation merges with Hoerner-
Waldorf. 
Rapid infiltration basin plugging first detected. 
Phase II of expansion begins 
DHES grants permit variance to discharge wastes at 
river flows as low as 4,000 cfs, down from 10,000 cfs. 
Phase II expansion complete. 
DHES grants another permit variance allowing discharges 
below 4,000 cfs, with additional monitoring 
requirements for dissolved oxygen in the river. 
Board of Health and Environmental Sciences adopts 
administrative rules to implement nondegradation 
policy. 
Champion International applies for a year-round 
discharge permit with liberalized permit conditions. 
Rapid infiltration system allowing disposal of only 14% 
of mill's waste. 
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DHES prepares Preliminary Environmental Review, 
proposes to grant most of Champion's request, and holds 
a public hearing in Missoula. Variety of groups call 
for studies and EIS. 
1984 
DHES postpones final decision on permit, and revises 
its PER in January and March. 
Champion International and conservation groups sign a 
Memorandum of Agreement, allowing increased discharge 
for two years and establishing special studies and a 
technical advisory committee. 
DHES grants two year permit, agrees to fund intensive 
studies, and to prepare an EIS before permit 
reissuance. 
1985 
Clark Fork Coalition incorporates 
Champion International agrees to sell Frenchtown mill 
to Stone Container Corporation as part of a $457 
million transaction. 
DHES releases draft EIS. 
1986 
State holds public hearing on draft EIS, and agrees to 
prepare an addendum 
Clark Fork Coalition prepares Citizens* Alternative 
DHES holds public hearing on addendum, postpones 
decision. 
Clark Fork Coalition and Stone Container negotiate 
compromise conditions. 
DHES denies request for increased discharge, holds a 
public hearing on nondegradation permit. 
Stone appeals decision to Board of Health, presents 
negotiated conditions in its petition 
Board of Health holds public hearing on negotiated 
conditions, and unanimously approves the request. 
1987 
Stone Container Corporation installs color removal 
treatment system at the Frenchtown pulp mill. 
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APPENDIX B: Cast of Characters 
This appendix lists names of individuals who are 
cited, or who played a pivotal role in this case 
study, followed by a date representing the period 
in which they were most involved in the Frenchtown 
pulp mill issue. 
CITIZEN GROUPS 
Western Montana Fish and Game Association (1957-62) 
Don Aldrich, member 
Bill Bush, President 
Les Pengelly, Member, Director Montana State University 
Wildlife Extension Unit. 
Concerned Citizens for a Quality Environment (1973-74) 
Ron Erickson, professor of Chemistry and Environmental 
Studies, University of Montana 
Gail Owen, free lance writer 
Clancy Gordon, Director of the Department of 
Environmental Studies, University of Montana 
Robert Curry, Professor of Geology, University of 
Montana 
Dexter Roberts, professor of English, University of 
Montana 
Jim Carlson, Environmental Studies Graduate Student, 
University of Montana. 
Jim Goetz, attorney 
Clark Fork Technical Advisory Committee (1984-86) 
Richard Solberg, University of Montana, Chair 
Larry Weeks, Technical Director, Champion 
International/Stone Container 
Merle Hutchison, Idaho Wildlife Federation 
Greg Munther, Trout Unlimited 
Don Willems, DHES 
Vicki Watson, Montana Environmental Information 
Center/Clark Fork Coalition 
Jim Carlson, Missoula City/County Health Department 
Pat Graham, or Dennis Workman, or Rod Berg, Department 
of Fish, Wildlife and Parks 
Ed Tullock, or Mike Beckwith, Idaho Division of 
Environment 
Mike Falter, University of Idaho, for Green Monarch 
Coalition 
Governor Schwinden's Citizens' Advisory Council (1985) 
Brace Hayden, Clark Fork River Basin Project 
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Howard Johnson, Clark Fork River Basin Project 
Ken Knudson, Clark Fork River Basin Project 
Ernie Corrick, Champion International 
Tom Cznich, Anaconda, MT 
Karl Englund, attorney, Missoula MT 
John Henson, Superior MT 
Greg Munther, Trout Unlimited 
Bill Murphy, Rancher, Garrison MT 
Don Peoples, Butte-Silver Bow local Government 
Clarence Popham, Corvallis MT 
Dave Suhr, ASARCO Inc. 
Tim Williamson, Clark Fork Coalition 
Jim Windorski, Anaconda Minerals Company 
Clark Fork Coalition Pulp Mill Advisory Committee (1986) 
Peter Nielsen, Executive Director 
Vicki Watson, University of Montana 
Greg Munther, Trout Unlimited 
Jim Curtis, Sierra Club 
Marty Onishuk, League of Women Voters 
Ron Erickson, University of Montana 
Dennis Workman, Clark Fork Coalition 
Tom France, National Wildlife Federation 
Jack Poulson, Northern Rockies Natural Resource Law 
Clinic 
Tim Williamson, Clark Fork Coalition 
Jack Tohulske, attorney 
Clark Fork Coalition Board of Directors (1986) 
Kathy Hadley, Deer Lodge MT 
Carleen Gonder, Huson MT 
Dennis Workman, Frenchtown MT 
Sam Burgess, Superior MT 
Tim Williamson, Plains MT 
Judy Hutchins, Heron MT 
Mike Demarco, Sandpoint ID 
John Camp, Hope ID 
Ruth Watkins, Sandpoint ID 
Don Stoecker, Georgetown Lake MT 
Fred Runkel, Spokane WA 
Ron Snyder, Missoula MT 
Dave Harriman, St. Ignatius MT 
FRENCHTOWN PULP MILL 
Waldorf Paper Company (1957-1966) 
Nels Sandberg, Executive Vice President Waldorf Paper 
Co. 
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Hoerner-Waldorf Company (1966-1977) 
Roy Countryman, Resident Mill Manager 
Dan Potts, Assistant Mil Manager 
Larry Weeks, Technical Director 
Champion International Corporation (1977-1986) 
Bob Kelly, Public Relations 
Dan Potts, Mill Manager 
Larry Weeks, Technical Director 
Dr. Al Wallace, University of Idaho, Consultant 
Stone Container Corporation 
Dan Potts, Mill Manager 
Larry Weeks, Technical Director 
Curt Barton, Wastewater Treatment Specialist 
Russ Frye, attorney 
STATE AGENCIES 
MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME (1957-1974) 
Walter F. Allen, Superintendent of Fisheries (1957-62) 
Bob Averett, biologist (1961) 
Ralph Boland, Chief, Environmental Bureau (1973-74) 
Boyd Opheim, (1973) 
Jim Posewitz, (1973) 
John Spindler, Pollution Control Biologist, 1957-62 
Art Whitney, Fisheries Biologist, 1961 
Wesley Woodgerd, Director, 1974-74 
MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF FISH, WILDLIFE AND PARKS (1983-86) 
Rod Berg, Clark Fork Fisheries Study Director 
James Flynn, Director 
Glenn Phillips, Pollution Control Biologist 
Dennis Workman, Regional Fisheries Manager 
MONTANA BOARD OF HEALTH 
Claiborne W. Brinck, Director Division of Environmental 
Sanitation (1957-62) 
Dr. G.D. Carlysle Thompson, Executive Officer (1958) 
Don Willems, Sanitary Engineer (1957-62) 
Howard Toole, Board Member, Missoula (1986) 
Ed Zaidlecz, Board Member, Billings (1986) 
MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES 
John S. Anderson, M.D. Director, (1973-74) 
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Loren Bahls, Chief Water Quality Management Section, 
(1983-87) 
Frank Crowley, Attorney (1986) 
Dr. John Drynan, Director (1983-87) 
Don Holtz, Chief Air Quality Bureau (1974-74) 
Abe Horpestad, Water Quality Bureau (1973-1897) 
Gary Ingman, Water Quality Specialist, Clark Fork 
Studies (1983-87) 
Bill Opitz, Deputy Director (1986-87) 
Steve Pilcher, Chief Water Quality Bureau (1979-87) 
Don Willems, Chief Water Quality Bureau (1973-74), 
Director Environmental Sciences Division, (1983-86) 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY COUNCIL 
Deborah Schmidt, Executive Director (1983-87) 
Hugh Zackheim, Resource Specialist, (1986-87) 
OTHER AGENCIES 
MISSOULA CITY/COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT 
Elaine Bild, Director Environmental Health (1983-86) 
James Carlson, Pollution Control Specialist (1983-87) 
Kit Johnson, M.D., Director (1973-74) 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
Bob Burm, Director of Engineering, Region 8 (1973-74) 
Bob Fox, EPA-Water Quality Bureau liaison, (1986) 
John Wardell, Director Montana Operations Office, 
(1986-87) 
Frederick Kreiger, Chemical Engineer, Region 10 (1973-
74) 
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